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INTRODUCTION
Independence and freedom are magic words in Africa
today, and they have been the primary objectives of
nationalist leaders in colonial areas for more than a
generation.

To the African, whether he resides in

Biafra, Angola, or Rhodesia, independence and freedom
signify dignity, position in the world, and new opportunities for social development and economic growth.
For centuries Westerners have referred to Africa
as the Dark Continent.

This has not been a reference to

Africans as black people, but, rather, a realization of
the West that little was known about the African continent,
its history or people, not to mention its great achievements and civilizations.

Westerners had never heard of

Zimbabwe or known the ancient glory of the kingdoms of
Mali, Ghana, or Axum.

Exploration and the slave trade

and translations from Arab historians and geographers
were responsible for the initial Western interest in the
continent.
Africa, in spite of all we know about it, remains
dark to the non-African world, and this is truly unfortunate at a time when the "eyes" of the world look to
Africa for political support and economic resources.
i

Man's inhumanity to man seldom has been exhibited anywhere
on Earth as on the Dark Continent.

How long is it des-

tined to remain dark to the eyes of the governments of
the world?
Western colonial powers have had a tremendous
opportunity to bridge the gap between the West and Africa,
and, indeed, there have been great material achievements
that benefited both the colonies and the colonial powers.
However, the intellectual trust that should exist naturally between all human beings has been almost totally
absent.

Herein lies the crux of the problem existent now,

as in the past, between Africa and the world.
Since World War II, thirty-eight African nations
have gained their independence, at the expense of Great
Britain, France, Italy, and Belgium.

These nations

emerged with representative governments.

Of these thirty-

eight nations, however, few have retained their representative democratic structure, most having become highly
centralized and antagonistic to the Western democracies.
This centralized structure is of concern to the
West, since the failure of Western colonial policies and
the political breakdown that ensues may lead to another
kind of colonialism.

For these reasons then, more must

be learned concerning the people and how they perceive
their national destinies.

Then, the West must aid in
ii

their achievement.

Only then can the West feel it under-

stands its burden to the emerging nations.
Portugal has the largest empire remaining in
Africa.

Portugal's history there dates to the Colwnbian

period, and its government boasts that a colonial philosophy different from the other colonial powers in Africa
is at work.

The Portuguese speak of a "civilizing

mission," "cultural assimilation, 11 and the "Lusitaniza.tionn of its colonies.

The determination of Portugal to

see its policies through and the determination of
Angolan nationalists to exact independence and freedom
from the Portuguese warrant an investigation of the current revolution and the basis of Angolan nationalism.
If the colonial powers in Africa had been cognizant of their responsibility to their dependencies,
would their policies have been altered to avert upheaval and disaster?

Would the F'rench government have

followed its traditional colonial policies and sacrificed
thousands of lives in Algeria, only to lose it?

Would

Great Britain risk another Mau-Mau uprising for the sake
of preserving British property holdings in Kenya, only
to lose them?

If these "enlightened" coloniel policies

had recognized the danger signals and taken positive
action, perhaps the African block would be more
iii

receptive to Western ideology and policy.
a larger problem?

Or, is there

Are the colonies so indispensable to

the welfare of the mother country, for example, Angola to
Portugal, that the Portuguese government will fight to
the end to retain its empire?
In th i_ s world of change, ideas and policies must
be constantly evaluated to encompass the real; reactionary
policies can only court disaster.

An understanding of

the past can provide insight into the present and offer
guidelines for future action.

An investigation of Angola

has exposed great weaknesses in Portuguese colonial
organization that must be altered.

The naming of Premier

Marcello Caetano to replace the ailing President Antonio
Salazar may permit movement in this direction.
The preservation of Africa to permit Africans to
develop their cultures and traditions and to develop
pride in past achievements must be recognized by both East
and West.

Both the communist countries and the Western

democracies look at Africa with a serious political
myopia.

Africa cannot be expected to develop as pro-

west or pro-communist but must be permitted to develop
as pro-African.
Africans were dispossessed so ci.:dly, economically,
politically, and mentally by colonialism.
iv

With the loss

of their homelands came enslavement, persecution, an
inferior status, discrimination, and dependency, in vol ving the loss of freedom and dignity.

A neo-colonialism

is not the answer to Africa's problems.
All peoples have a right to freedom and dignity.

This must be restored to Africa and to the Angolan
peoples if these natjons are to assmne responsible
positions in the world community.
This paper examines the divergent rolls of both
Portugal and Angola in this quest.

v
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CHAPTER I
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT OF THE SITUATION IN ANGOLA
A.

PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF ANGOLA

Angola lies between 4°22'S and 1S 0 03'S in latitude
and between 24005,E.G. and 11041 1 E.G. in longitude on the
southwest Atlantic coast of Africa.

Its area of 481,351

square miles includes the enclave of Cabinda, located
north of the Congo River and separated from Angola by a
twenty-mile-wide corridor of land.

Angola is bordered

by the Democratic Republic of the Congo--Kinshasa--on the
north; on the east by Zambia; and on the south by the
Trust Territory of Southwest Africa.

North of Cabinda

lies the Congo Republic--Brazzaville (see Map 1).

The

name "Angola" is a Portuguese corrupt ion of the word
11

ngola," meaning chief.
Angola is, in a geographical sense, a transi-

tional country.

In the north are equatorial forests and

grasslands, and the marshes of the Congo with their
luxuriant verdure and torpid heat; in the south, the
semi-arid plains and harsh desert east of the Mossamedes
littoral.

The coast is fringed by a plain which in the

north has a width of 150 miles or more but narrows until
1

2

it practically disappears near 170 south latitude.
Behind this coastal plain, the land rises in steep
escarpments to the plateau.
most of the country.
tropical.

This vast plateau covers

North from Lobito the climate is

South of this city, the cold Benguela current

influences the environment; temperatures are cooler with
diurnal and annual changes less extreme.
In general, the plateau is adequately watered,
averaging 59 inches of precipitation annually.

The most

productive area in this tableland region is the Bie"'
Plateau, Angola's loftiest agricultural region and most
import ant watershed.
B.

(See Map 2.)

DEMOGRAPHIC STRUCTURE OF ANGOLA

In 1960, the last year of an official census, the
population of Angola was 4,832,677, of which just under
200,000 were white.l

Latest statistics, however, esti-

mated that in 1965 the total population rose to 5,215,000,
of which 210,000 were white or mestizo.2

lnThe Angolan War " Portuguese and Colonial
Bulletin, Vol. I, No. 12 (February-March, 1962), p. 69.
2"White Outposts in Southern Africa," Editorial
Research Reports, Vol. II, No. 17 (November 2, 1966), p. 815.

3

Its inhabitants consist of numerous tribes with
long histories of separateness in their cultural
heritage and lines of authority.

The great majority of

the native peoples of Angola are of Bantu-Negro stock,
and only a small minority are non-Bantu Negroes.

In

the south there are some Hottentots and Bushmen.

In

Angola the term Negro is generally used to designate
the entire indigenous population of the country, while
the term Bantu designates those peoples who have migrated
over the centuries into the Congo Basin from an area
between Lake Tschad and the Upper Nile.

The most

important tribes are the Kimbundu, who live in a
rectangular area inland from Luanda and eastward, and
the Ovimbundu, who occupy the Benguela Highland in central
Angola (see Map

J).

These two groups comprise more than

one-half the total population, and it is difficult to
envision effective political control of an independent
Angola without the support of these two groups.

The

Kikongos, who live in the Portuguese Congo, are political! y, culturally, and historically 1 inked to the
Bakongos of the Congo-Kinshasa.3

Press,

3Thomas Okuma, Angola in Ferment (Boston:
p. 19.

1962~

Beacon

4

The most important group south of the Kikongo
tribe to reside in and around Luanda, the capital, and east
to Malange are the Kimbundu peoples.

Urban city life has

affected greatly the outlook and aspirations of these
people; they are more influenced by Western ideals than
other tribal eroups, speak fluent Portuguese, have many
students in the "liceus,n and are, therefore, more tied to
the economy and the political ideals of the Portuguese than
are other tribes.4

The Ovimbundu, who are located in the

central plateau area east of the Kimbundu, are the
largest group in Angola but are politically somewhat less
vocal, probably because of their geot:;raphical isolation
fro111 the m2in current of politic.el thought which centers
itself in the populous areas.

The Cuanham2s, who live in

southern An;:;ola, c:..re semi-nomadic cattle raisers, and,
because of their isolation from major population centers,
have been somewhat insulated from the ntide 11 of nation2lism
that has influenced many Angolans.

Independence, to the

Cuanh2nc:s, me2.ns a return to political freedom which predates the period of Portuzuese authority over their political destinies.

The Cuanhamas hc::ve not identified with

otter nationalist groups.

In the northeast corner of the

4okurna, 2.£· cit., p. 19.
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country are the Lunda people, considered one of the most
"primitive" groups in Angola and only recently active
participants in the struggle for independence from Portugal.
Also less influenced by nationalism are the Nganguela,
located in the southwest section of the country.

In spite

of the apparent differences in nationalistic fervor between
these people, the tribal leadership appear quite knowledgeable about one another's political aspirations.
When the colonial powers divided the African continent at the end of the nineteenth century, many tribes were
sub-divided by artificial political boundaries.

In Angola

this "geographic" separation of tribes created ethnographic
regions not oriented to an Angolan state.

Current tribal

populations are, therefore, only a part of a larger tribal
grouping (see Table I).
TABLE r5
Population of Ethnic Groups in Angola
Ethnic Group

Population (Est. 1965)

Kikongo
Kimbundu
Ovimbundu
Lunda-Chokwe
Nganguela
Nyaneka-Humbe
Ambo-Cuc:mhama
Herrero

500,000
1,100,000
1,500,000
3 60 '000
330,000
200,000
63 '000
25,000

5Ronald H. Chilcote, Portuguese Africa (Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), pp. 56-58.
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The description of the major tribal groupings
indicates the great diversity that exists within the
country and points to the obvious fact that the politjcal
boundaries of Angola bear little relationship to the
ethnographic or physical makeup of the country.

Ethnic

groups are many, and tribal boundaries are only loosely
related to political boundaries.

For example, the

Kikongo people overlap territorial borders and populate
large districts in the two Congo republics.

The Cuanhama

people of southern Angola are a part of the larger Ambo
tribe of Southwest Africa.
The physical boundaries of Angola further
complicate the

11

solidarity 11 of an Angolan state, since

the physical limits of the country are often rivers or
other features that enhance movement rather than provide a barrier to it.

The Congo, Kwango, Kasai, Kwando,

Cubango, and Cunene Rivers make up over 1000 miles of
border between Angola and neighboring countries, and
river routes have always been avenues of movement and
communication, transmitting cultural ideas and enhancing
the movement of peoples.

The relative absence of physical

barriers should now aid in linking the corners of Angola
politically and economically.

Inter-tribal warfare has

ceased, and the common bond of nationalism is now possible.

7

Internal and external forces are bringing these tribal
groups closer together; even though considerable differences separate them, the common link of cultural
homogeneity exists to serve as a bonding agent for future
political enlightenment.6
C.

THE ECONOMY OF ANGOLA

The most important single aspect of Angola's
economy is its tremendous potential.

This lends some

insight into Angola's present economic condition--a state
of underdevelopment.

In spite of this condition, the

country has undergone tremendous economic change in the
past few years--both in industrial and agricultural
investment.

The enormous economic potential rests with

the under-exploited mineral resources and the underdevelopment of arable land.

However, a rather primitive

communications system and a general lack of cooperation
between the white population and the Africans hinder the
development of these resources.
Agriculture is the chief occupation in Angola,
but methods of cultivation are mainly primitive.

6Jan M. Vansina, Kingdoms of the Savanna
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966), p. 19.

The Angolan sub-soil is rich in natural resources,
especially mineral deposits.

The value of these resources

is undetermined, since only in recent years have exploration and exploitation been undertaken.

Limited financial

resources and a reluctance to permit extensive foreign
investment also retarded the development of Angola's subsoil resources (until after 1961).

The present development

of mineral resources is politically motivated.

With great

amounts of foreign capital invested in Angola, the
Portuguese government is banking on foreign political
support to protect these financial interests, a modern-day
example of "dollar diplomacy."

Also, through economic

development the Portuguese government is able to reduce
the influence of revolutionary leaders who use the existent
substandard economic system as evidence of Portuguese
inability and corruption.

Portugal, however, does not

possess the financial resources to carry on a large-scale
economic development without permitting huge foreign
capital investment.
The 1961 revolt made it clear to President Salazar
that economic policies in Angola were in need of revision.
The economic plight of the Angolan citizen had to be eased
if his allegiance was to be maintained, and Angola's

9

economic base had to be expanded to help pay for increased
military expenditures if Portugal was to remain in Africa.
Foreign capital investment provided a partial answer.
The Alfred Krupp Corporation of Germany and the
Kowasaki Steel Corporation of Japan invested in the steel
industry.7

The Belgian firm Petrangel8 and the American

Gulf Oil Company explored and located large oil deposits.9
The development of basic industries attracted investment
in the secondary industries.

The General Motors Corporation,

General Tire Company, Soci~te Pechiney, Berliot Tractor
Company, Petrofina Belge, Krupp, and Opel were among the
investors in Angolan manufacturing industries.10

Signifi-

cant investments in the coffee and diamond industries also
increased production, thereby helping to ease Portugal's
financial drain.

?"Colonial Struggle," Portuguese and Colonial
Bulletin, Vol. VI, No. 4 (August-September, 1966), p. 342.
"Colonial Struggle," Portuguese and Colonial
Bulletin, Vol. V. No. 6 (December, 1965-January, 1966),
p. 306.
SttNew Oil Strike?" Africa Report, Vol. XI, No. 7
(October, 1966), p. 42.
9 11 0il Find in Cabinda," African Recorder, Vol. VI,
No. 1 (January 1-14, 1967), p. 1528.
10 11 Portuguese Africa 11 American Opinion Review,
Vol. VII, No. 7 (July-August: 1964), p. 8.

10

The above data are important to illustrate the
dependence of Portugal on Angola if a favorable balance
of trade and a balanced budget are to be maintained.

The

increased military expenditures necessitated by the revolution which began in 1961 have only increased Portuguese
dependence on the Angolan economy.
The interdependence of the Portuguese and Angolan
economies is evident, and the relationship of the two is
inextricably wrapped up in the internal problems of
Fortu6al.

Portugal, in addition, is short of capital.

Her

industries in Angola as well as in Europe are owned and run
by foreign industrial or investment firms.

Most of the

vital sectors of the economy are dominated by British,
French, and Belgian capital with great increases in
American and German investments in recent years.

There

has been, in general, a lack of educational opportunity in
both Portugal and Angola.

As a result the population does

not possess the technical skills necessary to overcome
foreign dominance.

Angolans and Fortu0uese alike are thus

placed in a position of subservience and must rely upon
outside technical aid.

In short, Portugal is not in a

position to give economic aid to Angola without foreign
intrusion.
The object of Portugal's economic policy seems
clear--to influence large companies to invest heavily, to

11

derive increased revenue by sharing in the profits of
these enterprises, and, in the event of an African uprising, count on these firms to mobilize public opinion
on her behalf in their respective countries.
The economic future of Angola is one of promise.
Hindering this development is the economic backwardness
of Portugal, itself an economic colony.
D.

A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF ANGOLAN HISTORY

Portugal's contemporary problems in Angola are
linked to the great exploits of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, a century after the Bantu migrated to
the Congo Basin.

From this early period, Portuguese

history has been bound to Africa and to the great Lusitanian
exploits of the past.

Portuguese manifest destiny owes its

conception to the ambitions of Prince Henry, "the
Navigator.n
purpose:

Prince Henry was motivated by a five-fold

to explore the unknown African coastline south

of Cape Bojador; to link Portugal commercially with any
Christian nations discovered; to determine whether
Mohammedan traders were influential in this unknown part
of Africa; to seek Christian allies; and to win Christian
converts • 1 1

(See Map 4. )

llchilcote, 212.· cit., p. 3.

12

More significant than his accomplishments were
two ideas which, once in motion, caught the imagination
of the Portuguese and became responsible for what is now
termed the Portuguese "mind"--the economic integration of
overseas enclaves with Portut;al, and the conversion of the
native population to Christianity.
The visit of Diogo cio to the Congo River in 1484
marked the initial attempt of Portuguese explorers to
carry out the "civilizing mission" of the mother country
as envisioned by Prince Henry.

On this voyage he carried

gifts to the Kongo chieftain King Nzinga-a-Cuum and
implored him to embrace the Christian faith.

This early

venture established a peaceful relationship between the
Manicongo and Portugal; the Portuguese motivation was
"to evangelize and in a sense nationalize, to seek alliance, not conquest.nl2

From 1506-1512, strone; ties were

established between Kongo and Portugal.
Alfonso, who replaced Nzinga-a-Cuum upon his
death in 1506, asked for and got priests, teachers,
masons, and technicians to help with military matters;
he also sent Kongolese to Portue;al for their education,

12James Duffy, Portuguese Africa (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1961), p. 11.
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in return supplying gifts of slaves and copper.13

By 1510

the Portuguese had established themselves as superior to
the Kongolese and racial harmony was, in general, absent.
Alfonso requested that King Manuel send a representative to
the Kongo with special jurisdiction over the Portuguese
citizens to help reestablish equality between the races.
In response, King Manuel issued a "regimento," which was
the codification of a program of Christianization and
Lusi tanization.

This document, unique for its time, w2s

a blueprint for the acculturation of the native population .14
Ironically, then, the cultur2l assimilation of the
population beg2n at the request of Alfonso, an African,
still the most revered political figure in Angolan history.
The regimento failed to achieve its purpose even
though its implementation bec2,me the focal point of
colonial policy.

Its failure was due mainly to the

undisciplined Portuguese colonials and t,overnment officials
in carrying out the intent of the program.15

13vans1·na ' ~.
on _1_.
c·t

'

p•

4°c •

14Ibid.
15Duffy, 2.E.· cit., p. 16.

The kingdom

14
of Alfonso, after 1522, declined in importance as Portuguese
attention shifted to Sao Tome, an island fast becoming
prosperous as an entrepot for the slave trade.
Angola's rise to prominence, though partially a
natural consequence of Portuguese expansion below the
equator, was stimulated by several conditions in the sixteenth century.

Sao Tome needed to tap a rich new area to

keep pace with the demand for sl2ves, and the Guinea trade
could not produce them in sufficient numbers.

Attention

focused southward toward Angola because the "ngola" wanted
to please his European friends by opening the slave trade.16
As a result Portuguese occupation shifted to Angola and
Benguela.

A militant policy which charged Paulo Dias de

Novais with conquering and colonizing Angola was adopted
in 1575.

Its prime purpose was to conquer and colonize

the coastal and interior regions.

Its ultimate objectives

were the acquisition of land for European settlement, the
expansion of the slave trade, and the discovery and control
of mineral wealth, especially the silver mines believed to
exjst in the interior.17
The Angola chief had wanted contact with Portugal
since 1519, probably because the slave

16Duffy, ibid., p. 137.
17Chilcote, .£I> cit., p. 66.

tr~de

would enrich

15

him and heighten his prestige.

To tighten its hold over

Angol2, Portugal expanded its infl-uence into the interior
regions.

Wars of TTpacification" were fought with native

tribes, and white Portuguese were encouraged to settle in
Africa.

The conquest of the interior began in 1575, and, in

a series of wars lasting forty years, the Portuguese and the
Angol2ns were able to control this region.

The subsequent

linking of Angola to Portugal by a treaty signed in 1656
ushered in the miseries of the slave trade which were to
continue until the last ouarter of the nineteenth century.
The Portuguese were persistent in their efforts
to convert the native population to Christianity and
Western culture.

After the advent of the slave trade into

Angola; however, with slavery the main Portuguese preoccupation, force became the principal method of persuasion.18

The ultimate goals of Portuguese occupation and

settlement were to achieve cultural integration with the
Angolan population, to relieve internal Portuguese problems
of overpopulation and economic poverty, and to establish
political superiority over a larger geographical area.19

lSchilcote, .212· cit., p. 7.
19Ibid., pp. 7-8.

16

The slave trade by its very nature destroyed any
humenizinc; attempts by the Portuguese.

Having solely a

materialistic purpose, the slave trade constituted the
greatest contradiction in Lusitanian policy.

It denied

equality of the races and implicitly implied that the
Angolan was inferior, thus destroying any meaningful
assimilation.

As one missionary stated, "At the side

of the missionary who carried salvation,

TT

Father Barroso

lamented, "was the buyer of men who destroyed the ties
linking father to son and mother to daughter. 11 20

For over

two hundred years the inferior status of the native was
perpetuated by the slave trade.
By official decree the slave trade was abolished
in lb7E, and, as would be expected, was met with a response
demanding its continuance for "humanitarian 11 reasons.
. . • and should the measure be strictly
enforced, the total annihilation and ruin of
the thriving and rising cotton and sugarcane
plantations, etc., will be the result . . . •
It is a pity that philanthropy should
blindly put so sudden a stop to a custom that
has existed from time immemorial, and of which
the evils are, in a country like Angola,
exceedingly slight. The effect of this measure
will be to destroy its nascent industry, the

20Quote of Father Barroso, Duffy,.££· cit., p. 23.
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only means for its progress and development, and
will plunge a great part of its population into
helpless misery for years to come. Let slavery
be abolished by all means, but only in the most
gradual manner, and in proportion to the industrial and moral advanc ernen t of the race. 21
This statement again reiterates confic.ence in the
idea of the acculturation of the native, even though it
met failure in the Kongo and had been partially abandoned
in Angola.
It was apparent by the last quarter of the nineteenth century that competition for the interior regions
of Africa would become intense; with no internal frontiers
all Africa inland from the coasts was considered to be,
like America in the time of Columbus, without government
and subject to the jurisdiction of whoever 2rrived first.
The Portuguese government aspired to consolidate inland
holdings by joining the colonies of Angola and Mozambique,
creating a trans-African empire.
In response to the competition for African territory, Bismarck called a conference in Berlin in 1885 to
submit the African problem to international regulation.
This conference attempted to dr&ft an international code
to govern the way in which European powers wishing to

(London:

21Joachim J. Monteiro, Angola and the River CongQ.
Macmillan and Compe.ny, 1875), Vol. II, p. 41.
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acquire African territory should proceect.22

The con-

f erence determined that a European power with holdines on

the coast had prior rights in the TTback" country.
Occupation could not be on paper only, however, but had
to consist of real occupation by administrators or
troops, each power giving proper notice as to the territories it considered its own.
A wild scramble for "real occupation 11 quickly
followed.

The Portuguese annexed huge domains to Angola,

with the intent of legitimizing its claim.

Portugal was

able to retain control over Angola partially because
Germany, Great Britain, and France preferred to have
this territory held by a minor power rather than bv one
of their significant rivals.23
The period following 1900 provided Portugal 11i th
a second opportunity to revit2lize its age-old colonial
policy, since it wes not until the period from 1900 to
1914 that the interior Angolan tribes were put under
effective Portuguese administrative control.

For the

first time in Portuguese history, however, probably
because of competition for territory with other powers,

22sybil Eyre Crowe, The Berlin West Africa Conference (London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1942),

p:-rgu.-

23Ibid., pp. 169-172.
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the extension of Portuguese influence brought with it a
tot2l loss of native independence.
With the loss of independence and the absorption
of control by Portuguese authorities, certain benefits
accrued to the native population.

Tribal

sl~ve

trading

was halted and the depopulation of tribes ended.

The

Portueuese government introduced legitimate commerce into
the interior regions for the first time and established
the ini tiel rudiments of formalized education.

With

tribal peace assured, disenses were effectively combatted,
and roads linked the interior to the coast.24
Tvvhen the Oliviera Salazar regime took over in the
late twenties, the "civilizing mission" and economic exploitation continued to dominate colonial policy.

For a

time empires were fashionable, and Portuguese spokesmen
during the thirties did not shrink fran boasting that the
colonies existed for the glory and profit of Portugal.
After World War II, however, such policies ceased to be a
source of respectability, but the economic objectives of
Portuguese policy in Africa remeined

unchant~ed:

cheap

24w. E. Abreham, The Mind of Africa (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 118.
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labor, lucrative markets, and the exploitation of raw
material resources.
Significant in the historical relationship between
Angola and Portugal was the declaration in 1951 that
Angola's status had been changed from a colony to that of
an overseas territory, thus becoming an integral part of
Portugal itself.

This change in relationship brought no

noticeable change to Angola, however.

Following World

War II Angolans were aware that the war had brought
independence to many colonial areas.
African nationalism began to evolve in the
Portuguese territories in the late 1940's and
early 1950's; not until the early 1960 1 s,
hmvever, did nationalism serve as the impetus
for direct action and struggle for independence.25
At what point in Angolan history did revolt against
Portugal become inevitable?

What was the last real oppor-

tunity President Salazar had to save a portion of the
Lusitanian mission?

It seems clear that the political dis-

ruption after World War II should have provided the impetus.
The war had meant economic paralysis and political stagnation to the Portuguese colonies.

After World War II, the

British 12,bour government c;,dvocated emancipation of the
colonies and set the political machinery in motion.
was no sense of urgency in Portugal!

25chilcote, .212.· cit., p. L~9.

There

In addition, World
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War II was a struge:;le 2gainst fascism and its anti-liberal,
an ti-parl iament2rian, an ti-democratic striJ.ctur e, which
Salazar represented to much of the world.

The war had

germinated idea.s against such a political structure and
identified it as tyranny.
President Salazar did not heed the warnings.
Instead, there was a reaffirmation of Portugal's colonial
policy, essentially the same policy that dates to the age
of Prince Henry.

The vision of a Pan-Lusitanian community

still inspires Portugal.

Luso-Africans and Luso-Asians

are to be joined together by a special bond:
born of miscegenation.

the loyalty

This loyalty, it is clsbned, is

able to override all others.

11

0ne State, One Race, One

?aith, and One Civilizationn--these are the bonds that
unite an empire.

This has become, despite its agelessness,

a part of the new mystique.
Speaking at the Colonial Governor's Conference in
1933, Salazar declared: 'I have in mind now the
great old figures of Portuguese colonization.
'I']-iey pass back and forth in my memory, these men
of yesterday and those of today, the soldiers and
administrators of 6the public trust in Africa and
the East . • . • '2

26K. Madhu Panikkar Angola in Flames (Bombay:
Asia Publishing House, 1962,, p. 4.
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E.

PORTUGUESE COLONIAL POLICY

Present colonial policy has its origins in the
past, and has been justified on both moral and legal
grounds.

The outlines of colonial policy were clearly

established during the period of expansion and colonization with the political objective being to control parts
of Africe and other areas and to weld these areas into
an empire based on friendly alliances.

The economic

objective was the dominance of international markets by
controlling a network of key commercial centers.

Another

objective was the evane;elization and Lusitanization of
the uncivilized peoples and the instilling of European
culture into the indigenous Africans' cultural values.
The latter objective, the

t1

civilizing mission,

11

is of

paramount importance to present Portuguese governmental
philosophy.
This policy asswnes, by the acculturation or
assimilation of the indigenous population, the superiority
of western culture, and, more specifically, Portuguese
culture.
Portuguese attention is focused on native policy,
which in theory favors assimilation of the African.

Educa-

tion is the vehicle by which integration is to be achieved.

23
According to Portuguese theoreticians like
Joaquim de Silva Cunha, the policy of assimilation
meant essentially that all inhabitants of the
colonial territories, whether white or black
and irrespective of their level of cultural
development, must be regarded as equal in all
respects and subject to the laws of the mother
country. A policy of assimilation is founded on
the idea that there are no essential differences
between the races. In essence, all men are
equal. . • • 27
A multiracial society based on Portuguese citizenship with
its concomitant integrated structure is to be the result of
the colonial policy.
Today, as in the past, the qualified African may
attain, if he chooses, full Portuguese citizenship and
attain the status of the civilized non-indigenous population.

The standards are difficult and are stringently

applied.

Applicants must be at least eighteen years of

age, be of good character, and possess those qualities
necessary to exercise all the rights granted to the
Portuguese citizen.

He must speak Portuguese well and

prove his ability to support himself and his family.
Anyone who has evaded military service or has been
declared a deserter is ineligible for assimilation.28

27chilcote, 2.E.· cit., p. 16.
28nuffy, op. cit., p. 295.
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Thus, the end result of colonial policy is to
assimilate all indigenous Africans into a harmonious
multiracial society.

This multiracial society is not

the mere coexistence of different racial or ethnic groups,
but is, rather, a society where all ethnic groups are
closely integrated and knit together with a deep feeling
of oneness.29

"Full citizenship," as conceived by

President Salazar, should be a nnoble legc:l concept," and
the granting of civil rights should correspond to a
genuine and lasting evolution, or else the peoples run
the risk of regression and a return to tribalism.
'A law recognizing citizenship takes minutes to
draft and can be made right away,' he said. 'A
citizen, that is a man fully and consciously
integrated into a civilized political society,
takes centuries to achieve.'30
The question-mark concerning Portuguese colonial
policy does not lie with the stated objectives or the
legal codes themselves, but with the extent to which they
hold meaning for the people to whom they are designed to
give significance.

(Lisbon:
p. 51.

Of the present population, approximately

29Franco Nogueira, Portuguese Foreigg Policy
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Publication, 1965),

30New York Times, May 31, 1961, Interview with
President Oliviera Salazar, Salazar Suggests Accord with
U.S., by Benjamin Wells, Vol. CX, No. 3774S, p. 12.

25

one per cent has achieved assimilated status, with the
non-assimilated living under a different set of laws.
Up to the early fifties at least, many European
observers felt that there was a real opportunity for
Portugal to accelerate the development of a non-racial,
integrated society in Africa.

Sorne were impressed by

the fact that in An£ola education and economic standing
in the community appeared not to follmv racial patterns.
It was suggested by some observers that that would have
been the most propitious time to widen ric;hts and
opportunities for the indigenous population.

Many

people had hoped that steps would be taken in this
direction.

Some Africans feel, however, that there had

never been any real racial equality or promise of racial
equality.

Authorities failed to widen rights.

Assimila-

tion progressed at .e.n imperceptible rate, and hope in
Portuguese policies waned.

Angolans observed the in-

dependence of other African territories, and sovereignty
for Angola was substituted for integration into Portuguese
society.
The many facets of Portuguese colonial policy
reflect a traditional belief.

The Portuguese continue

to profess faith in the dream of a Lusitanian community

26

and view Angola as the key to maintaining the empire.

As

if to support this faith, the Lisbon government has failed
to prepare the Angolan population for independence.

27

CHAPTER II
THE BASIS OF ANGOLAN NATIONALISM
While the great tides of African destiny sweep
fo~~ard, Portugal clincs with forlorn but stubborn
pride to the hopes and illusions of a bygone age.
The memory that Portugal was the first of the
European powers to explore the African coast and
establish posts on African soil was recently
brought to new life by the celebration of the
fifth centenary of the death of Henry the Navigator, a celebration deliberately aimed to dramatize the country's world mission. It has been the
dream of the Portuguese that they might be, not
the last of the powers to leave Africa, but the only
one which would fuse its African, Asian, and
European peoples into a single national whole,
perhaps even--wistfully--bringing multiracial
Brazil back into the fold.31
A.

CAUSES OF CONFLICT

The Portuguese government has adopted the position
that, prior to the rebellion in 1961, Angola was a land
of peace and tranquility.
outside instigation.

The rebellion was the work of

President Salazar cited the small

security forces in Angola at the time of the revolt as
evidence that hitherto Angola had remained calm and unaffected by outside agitation.32

Information provided

from sources other than the Portuguese govermnent, including statements made before the Security Council and

3lokurna, ££· cit., p. vii.
32New York Times, May 31, 1961, p. 12.
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General Assembly of the United Nations, indicate that
for some years prior to the 1961 outbreak, there had been
increasing unrest among local inhebitants.

Open resistance

and conflict originated with the accumulation of grievances
in An0ola and the impact of the movement toward total
independence of many African territories, especially the
Republic of the Congo-Kinshasa.

r·.'leasures to restrict

contact with the outside world, displays of force, and
the repression of Angolans suspected of political activity
could no longer forestall continuing disturbances and
protests.

Such measures, intensified after 1961, seem

only to have increased tension and precipitated further
conflict and guerrilla activity.
The grievances of the mass of the indigenous
population of Angola were based principally upon the nonimplementation of existing statutes and the fact that
statutes and policy implied the inferiority of the Angolan
peoples, especially the acculturation policy.
The policy of assimilation, proclaimed by the
Salazar government as the most important aspect of its
acculturation program, was not accompanied by a concerted
effort to prepare the inhabitants for status as citizens.
Only e. small number of Angolans have acquired citizenship
and assumed assimilado status.

The vast majority were

29
not afforded educational opportunity and were often subject
to discrlininatory legislation.

Even assimilado status

had deteriorated somewhat since the mid-1950's, since
there had been continuing pressure for an independent
status for Angola rather than assimilation with Portugal.
In addition, the vast majority of the indigenous population had no opportunity because of their tribal status to
participate in the administrative affairs of the territory
or have the right of franchise.

There is no doubt that

this lack of opportunity developed a feeling of being a
stranger in one's own country.

To acquire these privi-

leges, the indigene had to adopt a way of life different
from that of their heritage.
Angolans also complained of the denial of human
rights and an abuse of authority by governmental officials.
Political arrests, prolonged periods of imprisonment without trial, poor treatment of prisoners, and the disappearance of prisoners help to explain the gradual spread .of
nationalism throughout the countryside.

Legal channels

for the redress of grievances had not existed for the
indigene.
As the indigene became enlightened through better
communication and tra.vel or mission education, they came
to feel that they were the victims of exploitation by the

30

administrative system.

They complained of the tax system,

the compulsory crop quota systems, especially as regards
cotton, the inadequate prices paid for crop production,
and the inequitable wage scales.

With the influx of

Portuguese immigrants, the best arable land was developed
for these settlers, at times dispossessing Angolans from
their traditional tribal lands.

Perhaps the most grievous

complaint uttered by the indigenous Angolans was related
to the system of contract labor.

Called outright slavery

by some and veiled frequently by reform and liberalized
legislation, the labor system in effect in Angola was
seldom viewed with enthusiasm
legislation.

re[~ardless

of liberalizinB.,

Labor laws governing the indigene isolated

them from the mainstream of Angolan society.

Village

labor quotas, the contract labor system, the recruitment
of laborers for plantations, all were studded with the
use of force and the physical ill-treatment of the laborer.
In the politjcal fi.eld, demands for self-government,
self-determination, or independence had traditionally
been regarded as subversive, and, in general, had been
repressed.

The Portuguese government had never been

sympathetic toward any expression of Angolan nationalism,
and no forum existed where discussion and/or negotiation
with the authorities had been possible.

The authorities

31
even denied the existence of a colonial problem or the
validity of the right of autonomy or self-determination.
All political movements favoring autonomy or selfdetermination had been forced into clandestine activity
or exile with the subsequent result of revolutionary
activity.

With an increase in underground activity,

repressive measures were taken, especic::lly as neighboring
African territories gained their independence.
Despite repressive measures, independence movements gathered strength as the leadership of the various
opposition parties became more clearly evident.

Numerous

secret meetings were held throughout the country, especially in the larger urban centers and in the northern
region where the Kikongo peoples were most in evidence.
Anti-government literature was distributed through underground organizations.

After the independence of the

Republic of the Congo-Kinshasa and Congo-Brazzaville,
Angolan revolutionary groups were able to operate more
freely among the Angolan communities in these countries.
Communication networks were established between Angolan
groups in exile and members and/or sympathizerE; of the
cause in Angola.

Through this communication system,

rebel plans were made and executed with representatives

32

in even the smallest villages being aware of the progress
of revolutionary activity.33
Portuguese officialdom, concerned over the political activity in Angola a.nd the grovdng strength of revolutionery groups outside its borders, had increased its
pressure against persons suspected of political activity
or believed knowledgeable about clandestine rebel organizations.

After the 1961 revolt, homes of anyone suspect

were searched, and weapons were confiscated.

During this

period, as Africans were denied weapons, Portuguese
settlers, especially on the frontier, were supplied with
weaponry and trained in their use.
As repressive measures intensified durin8 the
1950's and 1960 1 s and the Portuguese government steadfastly rejected negotiations regarding self-determination
or independence, three Angolan political groups resorted
to guerrilla warfare as the only possible means of achieving their objectives.
and

11

This question of outside influence

agitatorsn linked up with these organizations looms

important, especially from the Portuguese point of view.

33Richard Mathews, HA Visit to the Rebels of Angola,"
Reporter, Vol. 25, No. 5 (September 28, 1961), p. 43.
(Hereinafter referred to as "Rebels of Angola. 11 )
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Whatever the extent that agitators have been involved in
the Angolan conflict or influence from other countries
may have been in evidence, these would not alone be
sufficient to explain the extent of revolutionary activity
or the widespread appeal of the movement, unless there
existed some genuine dissatisfaction and deeply-felt
grievances.
The overseas policies of Portugal have been based
upon the concepts of national unity end cultural identity
end the creation of a nmulti-raciallT society.

The success

of this concept demanded the recognition of common interests
in the economic and social fields, a degree of administrative and financial autonomy, and the acknowledgement
of the obligation of the Portuguese to protect the indigenous inhabitants and their interests.

All forces were to

work progressively toward the integration of Angolans into
Portuguese civilized society.34

Basic to this ideology

has been the concept of assimilation.

According to this

concept, any indigenous Angolan who wanted to be accepted
as a member of the Portuguese community had to break away
from tribc;l traditions and institutions in order to change

34Nogueria, .££• cit., p. 51.
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his African personality and to integrate himself into the
culture and custom of Portuguese society.
Within a theoretical framework, Portugal never
practiced racial discrimination and never wanted to
aclrnovJledge any difference other than those determined
by the levels of civilization.

Civil and political rights

were to be granted with a progression in education.
Theoretically, persons on the various levels in the
assimilation process were aware that equality existed at
each level, and ·were a.part from c:ny racial discriminetion.
Becoming civilized, the indigena did not meet with a
hostile or closed society, but with a
that integrated him completely.

11

Lusitanization"

Limitations to equality,

then, did not lie in a racial barrier, but in the cultural
and technical backwardness of the non-assimilated.35
B.

POLITICAL RIGHTS AND RACE RELATIONS

One main source of dissatisfaction leading to a
breakdown of meaningful Portuguese-Angolan ties, and,
consequently, to nationalistic activity, was the basic
distinction in status between the indigene and the non-

3 5s. de lJ~iranda, "Education in Ang,ola, 11 Portuguese
and Colonial Bulletin, Vol. I, Nos. 4 and 5 (June-July,

1961 ) ' p. 3. 7.
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indigene and the concomitant administrative practices.
This basic distinction between European and non-European
ways of life permeated all phases of society and became
the basis of various discriminatory laws and practices.
Under the Statute of 1954, for example, no political
rights were granted to indigenous persons in respect to
non-indigenous institutions.

The Portuguese felt that

non-indigenous institutions should be aspired to by the
indigena and wanted the assirnilado to feel the significance of his status.

Thus, the policy of assimilation

became unacceptable not only in theory but even more in
practice, since it was based on a racist concept implying
the incompetence of the African people and implying further
that African cultural mores wBre of no value.36

That many

Angolans, once assimilated, reverted to the status of
the indigene substantiates this point.

The granting of

citizenship was not irrevocable; according to the Statute
of 1954, Article 64, "The citizenship conceded or recognized • • • can be revoked by decision of the judge of the
respective circuit on the basis of evidence of competent

J6 11 Atlantic Report--Angola," Atlantic, Vol. 209,
No. 3 (March, 1962), p. 26. (Hereinafter referred to as
11 Anr;ola. 11 )
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administrative authority.n37

This statute was not appli-

cable to citizens residine in Portugal.
The decision of an Angolan to assume assimilado
status was awesrnne.

In addition to the difficulties of

relinquishing the status of an indigena and of fulfilling
all the conditions rec1uired to become a citizen, he rejected
his ancestral culture and adopted a European way of life.
Thus, assimilation often had the effect of isolating the
educated African from his own people.

Africans were

granted equal status with the Portue;uese on the basis of
equal education and other requirements.

The legitimate

aspirations of the Angolans to progress along lines more
consistent with their own values and way of life were
ignored.

The recognition of elites based upon preparation

for full status as a citizen also appeared to create a
socially superior minority.

After the 1961 revolt, the

desire for assimilodo status lessened considerably.

This

was due to the growing desire among many Africans,
especially in the North, to retain their African identity
and a general reluctance to become totally identified
with a European culture.

37Panikkar, 2..12.· cit., p. 38.
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In addition, since the revolt the status of the
assimilado has been lowered by the influx of Portuguese
Dmnigrants.

Racial prejudice among this group was much

more in evidence.
The extent that racism has existed in Angola is
not without controversy; there is ample writing to
support either contention.

The writer's purpose and

his personal philosophy have tended to influence his
judgment in evaluating the situation or date..

Camille

Miropoix, writing in the tourist magazine, Travel, stated
It is a treat to see the happy African soldiers
at the changing of the guard and their great
pride at being Portuguese. There is no geparation between the white and black races. 3
Conversely, K. Madhu Fanikkar points out that the
Portuguese t1above all" want
. • • to be recoe;nized as a white power . • • •
This emphasis on colour--of the Portuguese being
the white man--is also to be found in the USA
and the Union of South Africa. It really
underlines the Portuguese position. They are
obsessed by colour; the struggle is seen in
apocalyptic terms as one between blacks and
whites, with the ever present danger that the
black will emerge triumphant.39

3Scarnille Miropoix, "Unpublicized Angola," Travel,
Vol. 107, No. 2 (February, 1956), p. 45.
39Panikkar, 2.E.· £it., p. 35.
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Panikkar further underscores his position by stating that
• • • the arming of white civilia.ns and the
formation of vigilantes who indiscriminately
slaughtered all blacks clearly show that her
object has never been to assimilate the African
but to keep him as a helot, to be extenninated
if he rose in revolt.40
The Institute of Race Relations, Oxford University,
conducted a symposium on Angola in 1962 and concluded that
the Portuguese were a non-discriminating people on the
issue of race, but discriminated by making class distinctions.41

By dividing the professions and income groups

on a racial basis, it can be shovm thc:.t the existing
social economic barrier is enough to keep a tacit color
bar in effect.

In general, Portur;uese and Africans co-

exist professionally only in the lower quadrant, where
competition is keener between the races.

The nnon-

discriminatint:; 11 aspect of official legislation c2n only
be perceived if discrDnination by class is recognized
with its stultifying influence.
Social co-existence of the Portuguese and the
Afric2n was a pleasant and convenient image to project,
especially with eighty per cent of the Angolan population

40ibid.
41Antonio de Figueiredo, 11 The Case Against Portugal,"
An ola A S
osium: Views of A Revolt (London: Oxford
University Press, 19 2 , p. 51.
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scattered over the countryside away from an urban environment and Portuguese socio-economic influence.42

This

partially answers ·why, four hundred years after the
11

civilizint:; mission" began, only one per cent of the

population had been culturally assimilated.
In most western white-dominated multi-racial
societies, political racism runs parallel and in proportion to the degree of prosperity of the colored groups.
This is true in the case of Angola.

Higher income and

Tfupper-crust 11 social groups, not havint; had tb e ir socioeconomic position challenged, saw no threat; the supreme
test of socio-economic competition between the races
never came, so restrictive legislation, such as exists
in Rhodesia and the Republic of South Africa, was unnecessary.
In Luanda, blacks and whites work alongside one
another on construction projects and mix in shops and
cafes.

In the slum areas on the outskirts, white families

live in near destitution aloneside black families with the
same economic conditions.

Discrimin&tion is not in evi-

dence at this lower societal level.

Unofficial segregation

42cte Figueiredo, 2.2· cit., pp. 51-52.
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exists, however, in the way of job discrimination, i. e.,
any job requiring an education.43

By law, no discrirnina-

tion of any sort can exist and an African can occupy any
post in business, the professions, or the administrative
.
. eauc2.tionc.
'
.
11 y qua 1 i. f ie
. d-· 44
services
wh ere h e is

In many

cases, qualified Africans working in schools, hospitals,
or the social services where integration exists have
whites working for them.
The Portuguese appear to have a tolerant racial
attitude, but, eiven a set of circumstances, think in
racial terms.

The awareness of race goes deep and can

come to the surface.

This attitude permits blacks and

whites to work on road ganr;s, mix in night clubs, have
some black judges and mayors in the smaller municipalities, and control two-fifths of all administrative posts,
mostly at the lower leve1.45

But this tolerant attitude

did not prevent the savage anti-black manhunt that followed

43A. J. Meyers, ncolor Bar, TT U.S. News and World
Report, Vol. LI, No. 9 (August 28, 1961), p. 54.
44Ronald Waring, 11 The Case for Portugal," Angola,
A Symposium: Views of A Revolt (London: Oxford University
Press, 1962), p. 44.
45 11 Angola Waits for It, TT Economist Newslaper, Ltd.,
Vol. CCIX, No. 6269 (October 19, 1963), p. 8.
Hereinafter
referred to as "Angola Waits. 11 )
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the savage anti-white manhunt in 1961.
11

Nor has racial

tolerancen added appreciably to intermarriage between the

races.

There has been in the past consirterable cohabita-

tion of races occasioned by necessity; i. e., the absence
of white women.

When the drug pentamidine removed the

fear of sleeping sickness, women carne to Angola in greater
nwnbers, with the consequence th2t interracial marriac;es
and cohabitation declined proportionately, although some
Portuguese continued to have their

r 1 mulJ:!ere~de

necessidade. 11 46
With the vast majority of Angolans living in a
rural-tribal environment, Portuguese administrators had
enacted a separate set of laws regulating those Africans
residing in a tribal state.

These laws had served to

keep intact tribal customs and preserve traditional mores
and attitudes, but, on the other hand, kept these Africans
as indigene and without a vestige of political, economic,
intellectual, or social freedom.

These restrictive laws

not only denied the indigene freedom of speech and franchise--"luxuries" even the citizenry must forbear--but
they could not tr2vel, work, buy, sell, plant, harvest,

46Clifford Parsons, "The Makings of a Revolt,"
Angola, A ~posiwn: Views of A Revolt (London: Oxford
University Press, 19'6'2T; p. 60.
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meet in groups, or leave their villages without the
specific pennissjon of the chefe de posto, the local administrator.47

Through these restrictive measures,

Portugal has steadfastly refused to admit that African
nationalism may eventually have to be accommodated.
Either the African was to become a loyal Portuguesespeaking peasant or laborer, or he remained a tribal
"native. 11

It should be pointed out that these tribal

laws were generally effective until forei0n influence and
ideas upset the social equilibrium.

With outside influ-

ence permeating the stable tribal structure and upsetting
it, especially after World War II, keeping the African
population under strict control became more difficult.
Until early 1961, there was every indication to
the outside world that Portuguese colonial policy, which
had hacJ the long-term aim of assimilation had successfully
insulated Angola against the influences of African nationalism.

After the independence of the Congo-Kinshasa,

however, nationalistic ideas swept Angola.

To counteract

the revolutionary movements that followed, all Angolan
natives became full Portuguese citizens after September 30,

47Marvin Harris, nsouth of Lisbon See the Ten
Million, ri Saturday Review, Vol. XLII, No. 30 (July 25,
1959), pp. 19-20.
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1961, and the aboriginal status was officially abolished.4g
In African eyes, however, the Portuguese still appear the
bosses, and the rulers, and they hardly correspond to the
image this legal change was supposed to bring a.bout.

It

would appear that tl1is law and others adjusting other
aspects of Angolan life ca.me too late to make a significant difference.

C.

EDUCATION AND THE INDIGENA

A great influence on the African indigene has been
the quest for Western education.

In a society that had

placed its greatest emphasis on education, and had made
it the key to all the society held as desirable 2nd good,
this quest was understandable.

Education held the key to

social status, human dignity, job opportunities, and
economic wealth.

Education was the key to the success of

not only the African indigene but was also tied to the
effectiveness of the Portuguese administrative system.
The system required the training of local adrninistrc.tive
officers, postal clerks, native police officers, telegraphers, etc., for the administration of the colonies.
The government relied upon Africa.n interpreters who had

48w ar ing, 21?.. cit. , p. 4 5 •
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to be able to write and speak the Portuguese language.
And, more important, perhaps, to "Christianize,
wilesternize, n and to

11

11

to

Lusitanize, TT or to "2ssimil2ten the

native population, the educational system had to impart
a rudimentary knowledge of arithmetic, reading, speaking,
and writing.
To achieve these objectives, the Portuguese
c;overnment created

t'.·10

distinct educational systems--one

for Africans and the other for the white and the assimilc:ted.

This distinction was the "natural consequence of

the degrees of socic~l and mental development. n49

Schools

for African students were called rudimentary schools,
since they provided the first introduction to civilization.
The primary education system was provided for students
possessin8 a stipulated level of mental and social development.
Under the Portuguese Constitution, the Catholic
missions under the direction of a Portuguese See or
Bishopric were especially protected and assisted by the
government as educational and welfare institutions and as
instrwnents of civilization.

It was their exclusive

responsibility to provide instruction especially designed
for the indigene.

49okuma, £.J:2· cit., p. 41.
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The Statute of 1954 laid down certain general
principles to be applied regarding the education of
indigenous persons.

Article 6 of the Statute provided as

follows:
The instruction especially intended for
indisenous persons shall have as its general
purpose the moral, civic, intellectual, and
physical education prescribed by law and the
imparting of work habits and work skill, as
determined by the needs of both sexes and by
social and reP:ional economic conditions.
C..•

It further provided that
The instruction referred to in this
article shall always be directed towards inculcating a knowledge of the Portuguese
l&nguage, but the use of the vernacular
language may be authorized as a means to that
end.50
Theoretically, the rudimentary schools did not
constitute a system parallel to and distinct from the
primary education system.
was simply to provide an

The purpose of these schools
11

adaptive 11 education; pupils

proceeded from the rudimentary schools to the primary
schools.

The adaptive nature of the rudimentary schools

made it pre-primary in character, since they preceded
primary erlucation.

Therefore, there was no discrimination

50"The Statute of 1954," Yearbook on Human Ri~hts
(New York: United Nations Publications, 1954), p. 23 •
(Hereinafter referred to as Yearbook.)
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of a racial character.

The criterion applied was a purely

educational one; the pupils who attended the rudirner:tary
schools could not, because of their level of education
and inadequate knowledse of the Portuguese
fully attend

pr~nary

lan~uaee,

use-

schools.

The conditions on which a person of indigena status
could attend the primary schools had been laid duwn in
Article 6 of the St.c.tute of 1954:
Those indigenous persons who have received
tadaptivet training or who demonstrate, in the
rrumner prescribed by law, that they do not require such trainine, shall be assured of admission to public schools under the conditions applicable to other Portu8uese nationals.51
Under the Constitution, primary education is
compulsory and free to European and

11

assimilatedTT children;

althou[;h, once quc::.lified through adaptive education to
enter primary schools, there are no compulsory education
laws applicable to children attendint; rudimentary schools
or those indigenous children who mc:y have qu2lified for
prDnary education.52

(See Tables II and III for a compari-

son of PortuGuese educational standards.)

5lrbid.
52united Nations, General Assembly, "Report of
the Sub-Committee on the Situation in Anc;ol2, 11 A/RES/
497S, Sixteenth Session, New York (November 13, 1961).
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TABLE II
ILLITERACY

RATE>:~

Country

Popula_tion

Austria
West Germany
Finland
France
Belgium
Spain
Greece
Port. and Colonies
(Metropolitan)
(Colonies)

6,974
68' 500
4,241
43,264
5,868
28,976
7,973
21,159
8,765
12 ,394

Per Cent of
Illitera.£Y_

1-2
1-2
1-3
3-4
3-4
15-20
25-30
70-75
40-46
90-95

>:~source:

"Education Under Salazar, n Portuguese and Colq_n~al
Bulletin, Vol. 4, No. 1 (February-March, 19"b4l, p.

185.
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TABLE III
YEARS OF COMPULSORY
Name of Country
East Germany
France
En0land
West Germe:ny
It2ly
Austria
Belr;iurn
Holland
Spain
Portugal
Greece
Iran
Egypt
Ghana
Morocco

EDUCATION~:<

Age Limit

Length of
Course

6-18
6-16

11

5-15
6-15

6-14
6-14
6-14

10
9-10

8-9

6-12

8
8
8
8
6

7-13

4

7-15

6-14

6
6
6
6
5

~:<Source:

"Education Under Salazar, 11 Fortuvuese and Colonial
Bulletin, Vol. 4, No. 1 (February-March, 1964), p. 155.
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Many native grievances were readily traceable to
the inadec;uacies and basic inequities of the educational
syste1:1.

The system was not created to serve the indige-

nous population but to provide an adequate education for
tr10se r;ua.lifying as Portuguese citizens.

First, in the

interior regions of Angola there were few schools, even
at the rudimentary level.

Secondly, secondary education

was not easily accessible to Africans due to fees which
were exorbitant for most families.

Third, to enter a

government secondary school, a student had to be under
fourteen years of a8e.

Because most African children

begin school at a later age than Portuguese or assimilado
children, by the time the native child had completed the
adaptive course the age limit became a" serions hurdle.
Children of essimilado parents could 2utomatically attend
secondary schools, while indigenous African children were
compelled to comply vvith special requirements.

The status

of assimilation to wl1 ich everyone was to aspire was needed
to have access to adequate educational facilities, but
education was required for assimilation!

Thus, a vicious

cycle seer.ied to be operating, n1aking educ2,tion more
difficult for the indigenous African to achieve.

50

In addition, adr1tittance to e secondary school
required a birth certificate.
registered,

2

If the birth had not been

retroective tax was levied against the

pupil's parents.

Also, students entering from private

and missionary schools were required to take strict entrance examinations, not a requirement for Portuguese
and assimilado students.
The obstacles pl.s.ced in front of a native African
student were at least partially

respons~ble

for the small

nur.-iber of Africen students e:ttending secondary schools.
Also, the rudiHlentary course te.ught in the mission schools
was distinct from and inferior to the primary schooling
afforded the white or assimilated Africans in the urban
areas.53
To help overcome the inadequacies of the mission
schools and overcome much of the criticism heaped upon
them, the Bishop of Angola, Fr2ncisco Esteves Diaz, inaugurated a program aimed at providing a more adequate
rural education

syste~.

Much of the white population

blamed the 1961 uprising on the alleged teaching of
freedom end self-determination and sympathy for revolutionary croups within the mission schools.

A special

53 11 Kingdom of Silence," Harper's Magazine, Vol. 222,
No. 1332 (May, 1961), p. 35.
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tarc;et

2,t

this time were Protestant assimil2dos, many of

whom were trained in mission schools.54
As in most African colonial areas, education had
created an educ2ted elite.

The elite group was not large,

but actually enjoyed influence out of proportion to its
numbers.

This group was especi.slly important in Angola

since:
(1) the elite usually have sympathies and
interests that go beyond the traditional
tribal group; (2) they possess the skills to
run a modern nation; ( 3) they are interested
in building non-tribal organizations, such as
political parties .:md cultural societies.55
The creation of an educated elite has made Africans
conscious of the inequalities of the Portuguese educational
system.

The fact that a separate system was created for

native children is an irritant, and acted as a method of
holding African children back from entering into secondary
and higher education.
Revolutionary organizations relied heavily on the
inadequate educational system for much of their propaganda against the Portuguese goverrunent.

A statistical

54 11 Civilizing Mission, n Newsweek, Vol. LVII,
No. 25 (June 19, 1961), pp. 45-46.
55okuma,

.££·

cit., pp. 43-44.
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comparison between bleck and white education showed clearly
the gulf between r2.ces created through the school system
and how the inequity would perpetuete itself.

A ninety-

seven per cent illiteracy rate among Africens existed.
There 'dE:s room to acco::unodate only five per cent of the
indigenous children of school age (7-13) in mission
schools prior to 196o.56

Statistics like these did little

to instill confidence in the African population, and it
was not likely that they were to continue to look to
Portugal for a solution to their problems.
The 1961 revolt was responsible for many educational reforms as

2

crash pror;ram was started to close

the gap between the rural and primary schools.

Five

hundred new teachers were added to the rural program,
and space was constructed to ho1JSe 20,000 additional
pupils in 1962, with the program doubling these statistics
for 1963.

In addition, Antola's first university was

opened in Luanda in October, 1963, under the same program.57

56Homer A. Jack, Angola, Repression and Revolt in
Portuguese Africa (New York: American Committee on Africa,
1960 ) ' p • 15 •
57 11 Angola Waits,

11

212.· cit., pp. 239-240.
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D.

LABOR AS A FACTOR OF UNREST

The labor situation in Angola has probably contributed more to developing a negative relationship between
the African native and white Portuguese than any other
single factor.

This negative Dnage is due, in part, to

labor practices unchanged since the days of legalized
slavery.

Df~privation

and a 12ck of human dignity have

been the lot of the An[olan since the Portuguese first
colonized th2 west African coast.
The Portuguese government vvas one of the last in
Europe to officially end slavery in its colonies.

By its

abolition the status of the African was not suddenly
changed, and his relationship to the PortuL;uese was not
perceptibly affected.

The legal ten1inology was altered,

however, and slcvery was transformed into e. more "acceptable" labor system.

Slavery became tutelage, forced

labor, obligatory labor, contract labor.
As Angola became a prosperous colony and the demand for laborers incre2sed, Portugal becarne more dependent
upon it to maintain a favorable balance of trade and to
provide raw material resources.

Portucal's pre-capitalist

mercantilist economic philosophy placed a greater demand
on Angola through the years.

The labor system, as it has
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evolved from slavery, was calculated to contribute to
Fortug2l its material and human resources in the most
efficient economic way practicable.
Under the Constitution, indigenous persons were
compelled to work, but only in specific instances.

In

this connection, Article 146 of the Constitution provided
that:
The State may only compel the natives to
work on public WDrks of general interest to the
community, on tasks the finished product of which
will belong to them, in the execution of judicial sentences of a penal charact~r or for the
discharee of fiscal liabilities.58
The use of compulsion in the recruitment of labor was
prohibited for purposes other tha.n those cited above.
The Portuguese government specificelly prohibited the
recruitment of native labor for any firms working for
their own profit.

By law, indigenous persons were free

to choose their own work, to work for themselves or for
another, on their own land or on land 2llotted to them
for this purpose.
The oblig2tions of the employer toward the worker
and the worker toward the employer were covered by the
Native Labour Code of 192$.

These obligations attempted

to ensure the workerts adherence to the terms of his work

5BuN A/4978, 2..2· cit., p. 27.
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contract, provisions which pertaine_d to the medical,
social, and educetional assistance to the worker and his
family and his return to his place of residence.

For

example, the ew.ployer vvas to carry out scrupulously the
terms of the contract; he could not require the performance of work beyond the strength of the vvorker; he could
not prevent the worker frorn living with hi2.

ovm

family if

working aw&y from home; he could not require the worker
to buy goods from company stores and had to prohibit the
sale or distribution of alcoholic beverages.

The worker,

on the other hand, was to obey the employer's orders
provided they were in agreew.ent with the Native Labour
Code.

He was to perform all work enthusiastically and to

the best of his ability and he could not leave the place
of employment without previous authorization of the
employer.

By the Native Labour Code, every indigenous

male inhabitant over eighteen years of age was obliged
to procure an individual work-book (caderneta indigena)
to serve as an identity card and record of employment.
This work-book contained a profuse amount of data, including person al 2.nd family inf orrnation, identification marks,
employment history, and the m&nner in which he performed
his duties as a native worker.
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In addition to these entries, the caderneta
indigena contained informstion relative to the payment of
the native tax, vaccinations, or other treatment pertaining to infectious diseases, the lands ovmed by the holder
or freely assigned to him, the cattle which he owned and
their registered brand, and other information which would
be helpful as identification or in establishing rights.
The Statute of 1954 iterated the official position
of the government as it releted to the value of work:
The State shall endeavor to teach the indigenous
peoples that work is an indispensable element
of progress, but the authorities may not impose
labour except in the cases explicitly prescribed
by law.59
llfrogress," in this sense, implied that work was a part
of the civilizing process even though there was little
evidence to prove that work was a civilizing agent.
There was, however, plenty of evidence that the native
worker was degraded and exploited.

Forcing the native to

get a new perspective of his work role and obliEation to
work often led to the exploitation of the native population. 60

59Yearbook, 2.12.• cit., p. 236.
60Duffy, op. cit., p. 157.
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The Portuguese government viewed work as a
11

moral obligation" for the indigenous native.

This meant

simply that every adult fourteen years of age or older
was required to work, and the work had to be productive.
Further, he had to support h irn2. elf and his farn ily end to
contribute to the development of the territory, i. e., to
be employed on public works.

He had to work, in the

absence of other employment, at least six months per year.
The fulfillment of these laws and regulations led
to many abuses, especially in reE;ard to the vast majority
who 1.vere farmers.
tive.

Africans had to show they were produc-

The burden fell on every adult Angol2n African,

the ;;iajority of whom normally lived on the lend, to prove
to the local authori_ties that he was a productive element
in the economy.
This system of contract and obligatory labor has
been defended by some apologists as the only system by
which the indigene could be civilized, while retaining the
tribal character of the people.61

To the defenders of the

labor system this is the secret of Portugal's success as
a civilizing agent.

Legally, contract and obligatory

labor were based on the Native Labour Code, which stated

61Dr. Frederick P. Marjay, 11 Angola, 11 Seccao
Anuario Comercial de Portugal (Lisbon: Livraria Bertrand,
S.A., 196~ p. 32.
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that every African had to satisfy the administration that
he had h1orked .st leest six months in the previous year,
or was workine at the time of inquiry.

If the worker

could not prove this, the odministration had the duty to
put hDn to work.

According to the law, the African either

had to work in his own fields or to take a job with any
employer who had a position.

Workers were requisitioned

by employine firms through the Governor-General, requesting the fulfillment of the orders by local chefes de posto,
who were then obliged to

11

recruit 11 the workers.

The

PortuBuese Constitution and the Native Labour Code
specifically forbid

11

all L1ettiods by which the St2te under-

takes to supply Native workers to employers," and

11

all

methods by which natives living in any territorial area
whatsoever may be compelled to work for such employers
under eny pretext whatsoever. 11 62

In feet, however, for

the overwhelming mass of poor natives, there was nothing
to look forwc:rd to but c:. lifetime of meniel 12bor, much
of it forced.

Tens of thousands of Angolan natives were

rounded up annually and assigned to public works projects
at 1vages which varied from $2 to $5 per month (reported
in 1961).63
62Basil Davidson, !'Africa's I·~odern Sl2very, 11
Harper's Magazine, Vol. 212, No. 1250 (July, 1954), p. 57.
63 11 The Next Explosion in Africa,
No. 1 (January 7, 1961), p. J.

11

Nation, Vol. 192,
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The contract labor system ran contrary to the
traditional work patterns of native society which had
existed for hundreds of years.

Traditionelly, women did

all the work that sustained the family from season to
season.

Polygamy was common until recently as a partial

solution to the tc.sk force needed to keep the family alive
in a subsistence economy.

Work in its elf was considered

neither ennobling nor desirable by the males, and, wherever possible, was left to the women.
syst~1

This societal

did not encender itself to the labor system of the

white man or to his demands upon the black men to perform
work according to westernized standards.

Neither contract

and obligatory labor nor the low wage scales would induce
the native to abandon his tribal state or the traditional
subsistence economy.

To this extent, then, the forced

labor system was an evolved form of slavery with the
individual ownership of a slave being replaced by the
collective ownership of the African population by the
Portuguese [~overnment and the business community. 64

Henry

Nevinson and James Duffy in their investigations could
find little distinction between contract labor and slavery.
In addition, Basil Davidson has reminded us that, contrary
to the conviction of many Europeans, very little was "done
64de Figueiredo, .21?.· cit., p. 53.
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for" Africans under colonial lc:,bor systems, as these
systems were designed to bring cheap raw materials at low
prices into Europe to satisfy the needs of the growing
nwnufacturing industries.65
It should be pointed out, however, that the
Native Labour Code requiring six months' employment per
year was an attempt to adjust the labor system to tribal
life and customs.

An International Labor Ort::;anization

(I.L.O.) committee of three (Uruguay, Senegal, and Italy)
visitin£ Aneola in 1962 reported favorably about the
Portuguese contract labor system in the area visitect.66
Dissatisfaction with the labor system has been widespread,
however, and must be seen as one of the most important
causes of unrest in the countryside.
Local chefes de posto were required to recruit
laborers from those natives who had not satisfied the
work requirement.

For public works projects requiring

larc;e numbers of workers, laws were not strictly adhered
to.

Anyone in the villace was eligible if the local

quota for workers was high and workers scarce.

For

65Basil Davidson, "Guide to African History,"
African Studies (formerly Bantu Studies), Vol. 23, Nos. 3-4,
(Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1964) p. 62.
66Gene Farmer, "Dictator on the Defensive,!! Life,
Vol. 52, No. lS (May 4, 1962), p. 105.
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special projects, such as buildine roads or laying railroad ties, any pretense at contract labor was, therefore,
abandoned, and whole towns were conscripted, reportedly,
even children under fourteen, including girls and pregnant
women.67

Not infrequently, whole towns would disappear

into the wilderness as the chefe de posto would enter to
conscript workers.
The same was true in the cotton industry.

Cotton

has been the traditional crop in the Catete, Muxima, and
Bolange regions for many generations, with European
farmers devotint_: a great deal of time to it in the past.
From the earliest cultivation dates, the Portuguese
government protected and enhanced the industry through
the institution of export bounties and the euarc:mteed
purchase of the cotton crop at a fixed price.

Cotton

cultivation made real progress under this program, and
native

An~olans

participated at a faster growth rate than

whit<:; or assimilated AnLolans or immigrants.
region in

~alange

The Cassange

alone was responsible for more than

fifty per cent of the total Angolan production, and
Catete for more than twenty per cent.

The cotton program

was a source of many serious grievances, and, interestingly

67Richard LeMaster, 11 1 Saw the Horror of Angola, 11
Saturd§_y Evening Post, Vol. 235, No. 19 (May 12, 1962),
p. 53.
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enough, the 1961 revolt against Portuguese rule had its
first and most important impact in the cotton-growing
regions of northern Angola.
In the cotton-growing areas where the governmental
program was in effect, every adult indigena was required
to groH a certain c:rea in cotton.
received no

wa~es,

The cotton-raiser

but at the end of the season was paid

according to the c:imount of cotton he had produced at
prices fixed by the

goverru~ent.

Because the indigenous

inh2bi t ants could not move mvc.y from the

are.s~

without

special approval, the indigene born in the cotton-zrowine
area had no choice but to implement the program.

The

cotton program had certain aspects which paralleled forced
cultivation.

Africans believed they were at the mercy of

the Portucuese governmental monopoly.
Cot ton cul ti va ti on was not highly adv an. ced, and
the soil was rapidly depleted, leading to shifting cultivation.

As quotas could not be met, the government

assigned plots of land to the farmers for cultivation.
Over the years, many farmers were tilling soil on plots
as far as fifty miles from their residence.

In many

cases, farmers could not return home daily, and, in effect,
became involuntary migrant laborers.

The only other

recourse open to them was to move to the new plot and
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remain there until the soil was exhausted, thus requiring
another move.

More often than not, however, families

were required to reme in in the vill 2ges to cult i Vee te the
food crops and care for livestock on private plots of
land, since £rowing crops other than cotton on assiEned
lands, or raising livestock, was prohibited and punishable.
Complaints were frec;uent.

Many claimed that

government cotton prices were fixed low, at a bare subsistence level, and that, at times, the fixed prices
themselves were not paid.

An investigation conducted by

the United Nations throue:h the I.L.O. (International
Labour Organization) confirmed these complaints as justified notin.e; price and wage inequities existed.66

With

the inequitable price structure and the other evils built
into the system, the cotton program was the source of much
tribal unrest.

The injustices arising from the program

led to uprisings in two cotton-growing areas in 1960 and
1961, Catete and Malant;e.

The revolt was responsible for

the repealine; of the compulsory cotton cultivation laws
in May, 1961, three months after the rebellion began.
Also, Portuguese Overseas Minister Moreira announced that,

68uN A/4976, .21?.· cit., p. 30.
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in October, 1962, the Native Labour Code was to be altered
to abolish compulsory labor and punishment for absenteeism. 69
E.

THE CHURCH AS A DISRUPTIVE FORCE

The missionary movement had been a part of
Portuguese colonial policy since Prince Henry and Diogo
Cao first made the "civilizing mission!! an indispensable
aspect of Portueuese thought.

The task of Christianizing

the African was entrusted to the Roman Catholic Church.
Since that time it shared most of the successes and failures of Lusitanian policy.

Catholic missionaries were

eac;erly s ou['.;ht by the Portuguese government to assume the
res pons i bi li ty of

Tl

civil iz inc; 11 the Anf:ola.n natives by

recasting hjm sociologically as a western European.

Since

the Roman Catholic Church was an integral part of the
Portuguese culture, it was natural that this partnership
enjoyed a preferential status in the colonies.
Protestant missionary groups, not enjoying a
favored position, did not become a part of the colonial
structure until 1885 when the Berlin Act of that year
required all signatories at the conference to agree that:

69 11 Labor Reforms Planned for Portuguese Africa,n
Africa Report, Vol. 7, No. 8 (August, 1962), p. 20.
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They (i.e., all signatories) shall, without
distinction of creed or nation, protect 2nd
favor all religious, scientific, or charitable
institutions, 2nd underta 1:<::ings • • . which aim
at instructing the nc:tives and bringing home
to them the blessing of civilization.
Christian :-rlissionaries • • . shall likewise be
the objects of special attention. Freedom of
conscience and religious toleration are expressly guaranteed to the natives, no less than
to subjects and to foreir,ners.70
While both Catholic and Protestant missionaries have had
measurable success converting large portions of the
population (over fifty per cent), there is a serious
question regarding the extent and depth that this influence has had upon African life.

There is, however, no

doubt that Angola missionary activities led to the modification of the Anc:olan traditional society, through
education, through the weakening of traditional authority,
through the introduction of the ideal of equality, and
through the creation of an African clergy.71
Neither the Catholic nor Protestant church in
Angola took an official position on African nationalism
or the revolt of 1961.

Official ties of the Catholic

Church to the Fortur;uese government negated chances that
an official pronouncement regarding the rebellion would
be made.

Having no official governmental ties, Protestant

70crowe, 2.£· cit., p. 190.
7lokuma, 2.£· cit., p. 51.
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missionary societies enjoyed greater latitude in the
educational influence they had, especially regarding
nationalism, and were freer to criticize.
The Catholic clergy had, by and large, felt control by Portuguese officialdom, and, indeed, most missionaries permitted other national cultures to permeate
Angola.n society end in this way to
alien to the Portuguese stereotype.

11

teach" standards
Most Protestant

missionaries used the native language in mission schools,
thus impeding the implantation of Portuguese language and
customs.72

Legally, native languages could be used only

to facilitate the teaching of the Portuguese language.
The 1961 revolt created problems for the Catholic
and Protestant churches in Angola.

Angolan clergymen,

like Canon dos Neves, Vicar-General of the Archbishopric
of Luanda, and the Chancellor of the Diocese, the
Reverend Pinto de Andrade, openly sided with the rebel
element and were arrested and imprisoned for their
11

pol i tic al crimes.

11

On April 15, 1961, the bishops of

Angola met in Luande, and, althour:h they condemned the
attacks made by the African Nationalists on villages,
also pointed out that the just aspirations of the people

72okuma, 212.· cit., p. 53.
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had to be taken into account by the Portuguese government
if they wished to avoid discontent and trouble.73
'

1

The

official" position of the Catholic bishops of Angola

was read to 211 parishioners in May, 1961, in the form
of a pastoral letter, a portion of which st2ted:
Disillusioned people fighting against privation
are a prey to despair and more apt to be carried
away by dangerous ideologies and promises which
cannot be fulfilled. Poverty is a bed counselor
and a threat to tranquillity and peace. The solution of certain problems cen be found only throut_;h
united and adequate legislation and the total and
generous cooperation of individuals and oreanizations. 74
In Jime, 1961, the situation became so intolerable
thc:,t Protestant and Catholic clergymen in the United
States and Canada, prompted by missionaries in Angola,
a;)peeled to end the
colony," and

11

11

wholesale bloodshed in the Portuguese

urged a joint consultation of Portuf;uese

and Angolan leaders to end indiscriminate killings by
seeking a reasonable solution to Angola's problems. 11 75
Similar requests for restraint and understending came

73nThe Catholics and Salazar, 11 Port~uese and
Colonial Bulletin, Vol. II, No. 1 (April/rllay, 1902), p. 79.
71+ 11 0pen Letter on Portugal,
No. 13 (June 23, 1961), p. 326.

11

Commonweal, Vol. 74,

75"Angolan Massacres Continue,n The Christian
Century, Vol. LXXVIII, No. 3 (July 26, 1961), p. 894.
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from the World Council of Church es, the Council for
?reedorr: in

Portw~~al

encl the Colonies (located in Loncl on),

the Baptist Missionary Society, and influential Catholic
cler,symen, like the Bishop of Oporto.

These groups or

individuals openly broke vvith Premier Salazar's policies
in Anc;ola.
The Portuguese Government is aware of the potential threat to colonial rule from Catholic and Protestant
churches and organizations.

In response to this threat,

the Governor-General of Angola ordered local administrative
officials to attend all church services and meetings held
in their juridical areas.76
While no official judgment publicly condemned the
churches' role as instruments in the civilizinc; process,
there was a £1:reat amount of criticism ag2inst missionary
societies for their role in training catequistos.

Accord-

ing to the Portuguese goverrunent, the Gospel taught in the
mission schools was unquestionably a factor in developing
a spirit of self-determination among the Angolan people.
The

11

failure 11 of missionaries to teach patriotism and

loyalty to the Portuguese government and the "influence
of outsiders" were to take the blame for the unrest in
the

An~olan

countryside.

-----·--76okurna, .2..£· cit., p. 57.
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CHAPTER III
REVOLUTIONARIES AND THE REVOLUTION
While the other colonial powers were coming to
terr.13 with their colonies, each in its own way, with the
rising African nationalism of the post-World War II
period, Portugal preferred to deny that she had any problem in her territories, and tbus made no serious attempt
to deal with it.

It was, of course, impossible that

Angola could be insulated against the independence movements that have swept through Africa the last two decades.
PortU£::uese policy failed to recognize the legiti11acy of any nationalist aspir2.tions for self-deternii112tion
and independence of Angola.

The stated objective of

Portuguese policy vvas to create an integrated mul ti-rc:cial
society in Anc:ola as the only lesting solution to tllat
territory's problems.

President Salazar stated just prior

to the February, 1961, revolt:
The familiar treatrnent of successive generations
has forced 2nd consolidated the unity that was
foreseen at the outset. It is, therefore, no
political or legal fiction but a social and
historical fact translated in Constitutions,
which raises very serious difficulties for those
who intend to dedicate themselves now to the
task of emancipating Portuguese Africa. They
come too late, for the job has already been
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done. That unity does not allow of transfers, cession, or abandonment. The juridical figures of the plebiscite, the referendum, auto-determination do not fit into
its structure either.77
And yet, the Angolan revolution is now in its
eighth year.

This revolution is the first genuine

challenge to the Portuguese colonial system, and there
appears to be every indication that the revolt will continue until the Angolan problem is ultimc:tely resolved.
To help determine the

11

immediate 1' c2use of the insurrec-

tion, a United Nations investigation committee with
Bolivia, Dahomey, Finland, The Federation of Malaya, and
Sudan serving as members was named.

Their report stated

that the development of politicc:'.l aspirations a.mane: the
Angolan peoples appee.red to stern from the lack of an
ability to express grievances, especially over the loss
of their· land to Portuguese farmers, to cotton cultivation, and to harsh labor conditions and policies.78
Some expression had been permitted in the 1920 1 s
when the HLiga Africana 11 and the Regional Association of
the Natives of Angola were formed.

These groups 1r.rere not

77Portuguese Foreign Policy ,''Portugal and the
Anti-Colonialist Cmnpaign; 1 Oliveira Salazar, speech delivered before National Assembly, November 30, 1960,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Bulletin (1965), p. 13.
78uN (A/4978), 22· cit., p. 42.
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permitted to act as a vehicle for criticism against conditions or policies.

They were formed to forge a closer link

between Portuguese officialdom and the Angolan native population.

After World War II, many insurrectionist groups

were forL1ecl in other African colonies.

Angol2.n leaders

renewed efforts to give expression to their grievences
and political aspirations.

Because Antolan nationalist

activities were not permitted, this led to the formation
of cla.ndestine underground political or[enizations which
extended their activities from inside Anc;ola to those who
had fled the territory and were residing in neighboring
countries.

It would appear that the only

11

benefit 11 to

the Portuguese prohibition of political activity gained
at this point was time--the world press would not become
nAngola-rnindedll until 1961; until thet tirae, silence in
the countryside would be synonymous with peace and
harraony.
Althour::h between thirty-five and forty revolutionary
groups organized in Angola since 1954, only three have
garnered popular support in large nwnbers and are able to
conduct guerrilla activity on a respectable scale.

In

1954, the U.P.A. (Union of the Peoples of Angola) was
founded in Leopoldville in the Republic of the Congo
under the leadership of Holden Roberto.

In 1956, the
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M.P.L.A. (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola)
was organized inside Angola by Dr. Agostinho Neto and
Mario de Andrade.

In 1959, the M.P.L.A. was declared a

subversive organization by the Portue.::uese government, and
was, therefore, moved to Conakry, Guinea, and then to
Leopoldville, Congo.

In 1966, U.N.I.T.A. (National Union

for the Independence of all of Angola) under the leadership of Jonas Savimbi was founded by a revolutionary
vling of the U.P.A. which had [;rown dissatisfied vvith
Holden Roberto's leadership.

The U.P.A. passed out of

existence in 1962 when G.R.A.E. (Revolutionary Government
of Angola in Exile) emerged.

G.R.A.E. represented a

coalition of the FNLA (National Liberation Front in
Angola) with the U.P.A., which had a multi-ethnic leadership anrl a popular followinc amonc P.D.A. (the Angolan
Democratic Party).

The P.D.A. represented the Dazombos,

a sub-group, of the Dekongo tribe which is centered in
northern Angola and in the two Congas.

The Kikont;os are

also a sub-group of the larger Bakongo tribe.

Both the

U.P.A. and the P.D.A. had origin2lly organized within the
large

emigr~

population that had fled to the Congo-Kinshasa.

The 0.A.U. (Organization for African Unity) in
Auf;ust, 1963, met in Dakar where it was decided that
Angola was to be given top priority because of the state
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of war that existed with Portuga1.79

Top priority meant

that whatever material aid possible would be made available to GRAE by the OAU 1 s Liberation Committee.

Holden

Roberto, as president of GRAE, predicted a short war
with victory for the revolutionaries.

It soon became

apparent, however, that Roberto vvas underestimating
Portug2l's tenacity and overestimDtin.c the aid forthcoming from the 0.A.U.

Recocnition by the O.A.U. gave

impetus to an increese in the organizetion's military,
diplomatic, anrl educational areas plus that of refugee
relief.SO

If GRAE's resources were not adequate to meet

demands in these areas, there was a great psychological
letdown among the group's

membership~

Many Ovimbundu tribesmen wanted to see the revolution spread from the Bakongo stronghold in the north,
eastHard and southward, to open revolutionary activities
in this larger area.

This Roberto would not do.

He was

accused of favoring the BakonGO peoples and of failing
to expand the revolution.

(One important reason for

Roberto's reluctance was his friendship to Cyrille Adoula,

79John Marcum t1Three Revolutions
Vol. 12, No. S (Novem~er, 1967), p. 10. '
SO Ibid.

11

Africa Report,
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the president of the Congo-Kinshasa.

Adoula feared that

rebel activity in the south would c2use the closing of
the Benguela Railway, greatly needed to export Katangan
copper.)

Dh.:;2,ppointed, a general mutiny occurred among

Ovimbundu guerrillas, and GRAE's forei[n minister, Jonas
S2vimbi, chief spokesman for the dissident group, withdrew
from GRAE and traveled to Cairo.

Thus, instead of a

sin[le revolutionary group, three distinct groups were
actively seeking converts to their cause by the beginning of 1963.
In July, 1963, the OAU re commended that African
st2tes formally recognize the Revolutionary Government of
Angola in Exile (GRAE) as the only Angolan revolutionary
movement effectively fighting for independence.

This

pronouncement spurned the efforts of the T-:PLA and the
embryonic nsavimbi-ledn Ovimbundu element.

By November,

1964, Roberto's GRAE had been recognized by twenty-nine
African states.Bl

The only country to recognize the

Angolan Government-in-Exile to date outside the African
continent is Iraq.82

81 "Africa in the Soviet Press: Angol2, 11 The T·Iizan
Newsletter, Vol. 6, No. 11 (December, 1964), p. 22.
S2 11 Angola--Continued Guerrilla Activities in
Northern and Eastern Areas~ 11 Keesing's Contemporary
Archives (April S-15, 1967;, p. 21965.
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Pursuant to the OAU 1 s recommendation thot member
states should deal only with GRAE, the Adoula-led Congolese government in late 1963 closed the headquarters of
the MFLA and forced Dr. Agostinho Neto, its leader, to
move his offices across the river into the CongoBrazzaville.

Neto considered his moveffient sacrificed by

the forces of Himperialism, 11 acting throui;h the intermediary of a Congolese eovernnent that h2d given the GRAE
military trainine bases (Kinkuzu and Thysville) exclusive
access to the Angolan border, "de jure 11 recognition, and
support from the OAu.SJ

Neto organized his small militia

into whet was referred to as the People's Liberation Army
(EPLA) and launched rc:;ids on the enclave of Cabinda.
Many Angolan Bakongo tribes became interested in
restoring the former Kongo Kingdrnn to unite eventually
with the larger Bakongo tribesmen in the Congo-Kinshasa,
of which they were a sizable sub-group.

In April, 1965,

five Eakongo secessionist moveffients banded together,
thereby rejecting GRAE leadership.

This croup orcanized

the Patriotic Front for the Independence of Kongo from
Portugal (FFIDK) and attempted to negotiate with the
Portuguese government for sovereig;nty to be granted to

S3Marcum, 2.12.· cit., p. 12.
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the geographic region that was traditionally B2k6ngo.
The Salazar government, of course, refused not only to
accede to their demands but also refused even to recognize
them as a legitimately organized group.
This low point of 1964-1965 for Roberto's GRAE
cave Neto's MPLA an opportunity to regain much of the
stature formerly enjoyed while based in Leopoldville.
The principal problems of the I"1PLA ·were gettinc financial
backinE: and obtaining supplies to keep the revolution
alive and forceful.

As Congo-Brazzaville was receiving

communist aid, it appeared natural to the MPLA leadership
to tap this material support, especially since it was
commonly believed amonE; the rebel groups that n:uch of
Portugal's aid came as a result of its N.A.T.O. membership.S4

Soviet aid and Cuban instructors--even a visit

0
th e MPLA a renewe.d f ervor.
froln Ch /e uuevara--[ave

The

IIPLA had competition from e newly forrr1ed Liberation Front
for the Freedom of the Enclave of Csbinda (FLEC); however,
since

~PLA's

procra~

envisioned independence for An8ola

and Cabinda as a single unit and not Cabinda as a separate
nation, FLEC refused to cooperate with the NPLA.

The

latter, nevertheless, continued to concentrate its efforts
on Cabinda.
84 11 rJationalist Pla.ns Massive Onslaught Against
Portugal,'' African Recorder, Vol. III, No. 24 (November 19December 2, 1964), p. 911.
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As of lete 1967, the political and military
position of the MPLA was obscure.

Politically, it is led

by a predominantly Oviinbuncu intellic;entsia from the
Luanda-Catete region, and is dedicated to the thesis that
class, not racial conflict, should be the core of the
Ancolan revolution.S5

Its strongest appeal exists in the

urbanized sectors of the Kimbundu-speakinc corrmmnity of
over 1,000,000 persons in north-central Aneola, but its
milit2ry operc::tions c::re quite fragmented.
In direct response to the great problems faced
during 1964-1965, Holden Roberto announced that, if
offered, he would accept Soviet and Red Ch i_nese aicl. 86
In a speech delivered in Leopoldville, Roberto stated,
Until now we have kept out of the cold war and
within the frmnework of African politics, but
we .ere no'J T at a po int where a r&dical change of
pol icy is irnp~r2t i ve for us to make headway in
our struggle.ti?
1

He had come to the conclusion that the Western countries
were hypocritical since they continued to supply Portugal

85Marcum, 2.£· cit., p. 12.
86 11 Portuguese Africa," .212.· cit., p. 8.
87nForeign Assistance for Revolution,n African
Recorder, Vol. III, Vo. 8 (April 9-22, 1964), p. 740.
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with arms despite their declared belief in selfdeterminc:tion.

In .sddition, Roberto stated,

There is alweys insufficient aid for a revolution such as ours; it is from the African
countries tbat we have received 2id so far.
But our African brothers have their problems
too. ~ie will, therefore, appea~ to 2nyone for
aid--even to the devil himself. 8
The Soviet press watched the
closely in 1964-1965, and

2

An~olan

revolution

E':reat amount of propat;anda

aeainst Roberto and in favor of Neto and Andrade was
evidenced.

Two Pravda articles written by the Soviet

political writer, V. Midtsev, illustrated the official
Soviet attitude.

The anc:lysis lamented that the MPLA

and the UPA were actively competing with one another,
thus, "seriously weakeninc; their position and considerably dau1ac;ing the strw:;gle for independence."

Midtsev

further lamented that Roberto rejected the sugGestion of
the MPLA,

11 2

progressive p&triotic party,

front should be created.

11

that a single

"The Americans woulrl like to

make Holden and his supporters 'their men.'

11

"It is also

noteworthy that life is forcing Roberto Holden somewhat
to re-examine his position."

~ihile

11

until recently he

never turned for help to the socialist countries," in
recent months his speeches had indicated criticism of

ns Ibid.

0
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American policy 2nd a desire for eid from the soci2list
countries.

Midtsev continued:

The Soviet public does not epprove of the negative at ti tnde of Holden tmvards the unification
of all the national forces of the Aneolan
people in a single anti-colonialist front and
toward the question of cooperation with the
MPLA. At the seme time it evaluates positively
the change in his attitude toH2rds the socialist
countries. 8 9
The GRAE organization weathered the 1964-1965 low point
in its power and prestige, 2nd Roberto chose to continue
his independent path.
W1ile the 19G4-1965 period was a low point in
GRAE power and effectiveness, and was, indeed, a fight
for survival, it was for the MPLA the opportunity needed
for a comeb<'lck and possibly a wresting of control from
the GRAE.

The r'IPLA continued its hcrassment of Portupiese

positions in Cabinda; military operations against GRAE
forces in northern

An~ola

were begun, and a new third

front was opened in the Angolan panhandle to challenge
the Savimbi-led rebel forces there.
The strong force in eastern Angola was UNITA,
which had been orr,anized by ,Jonas Savirnbi efter his
break with Roberto in 1964.

UNITA was organized in

89nAfrica in the Soviet Press: Angola," The
Nizan Newsletter, Vol. VI, No. 4 (April, 1964), p. 21.

$0

Brazzaville primarily out of disenchanted or discontented
members of the MPLA and GRAE movements.
groups joined Savimbi's UNITA:
ex-GRAE militants

Three main

the AlVIANGOLA cadre of

(AlVIANGOLA (Friends of the Angolan

Manifest]); central and southern Angolan students abroad
who belonged to the National Union of Angolan Students
(UNEA), and local leaders of the former Chokwe, Lwena,
and Luchazi self-help associations.90

Angolan refugees

in Zambia also joined the UNITA organization.

In March,

1967, Savimbi 1 s effectiveness in eastern Angola was
greatly restricted when his Zambian residence permit was
not renewed.

UNITA forces had temporarily cut the

Benguela Railway link to Zambia, and the Portuguese
government had demanded that Zambian officials control
rebels using their territory as a haven or face closure
of the railway.

As in Katanga, the need to move copper

over the railway demanded that action be taken against
UNITA.

Ultimately, Savimbi fled to Cairo and UNITA

splintered into smaller, less-effective political groups.
The most ·significant aspect of the revolution has
been the ability of GRAE-leader Holden Roberto to survive
in the face of all obstacles and remain head of the most

9~arcum, .2..I?.· cit., p. 13.
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vibrant military force of the revolution.

One reason for

Roberto's success rests with the ability of GRAE-UPA to
occupy a prominent position in the minds of all Angolans
desiring independence.91

The UPA was responsible for

starting the insurrection and the Portuguese press,
broadcasts, and public demonstrations accused the UPA of
starting the war.

Through the years, the UPA (now GRAE)

has remained a household "wordlT in Angolan towns and
villages.
Holden Roberto, president of the revolutionary
Angolan Government-in-Exile, was born in the small
Angolan town of Sao Salvador in 1925.

In 1927, his

family moved to the Congo, and he has returned to Angola
only four times since infancy--in 1932, 1940, 1951, and
1956.

Roberto's first inclination to become a revolu-

tionary and fight the Portuguese came during a visit to
Angola in 1951 when he witnessed a chefe de posto beat
and kick an old man.

In the same year, Roberto, himself

a Protestant, sought aid from Protestant organizations
and the United Nations.

In 1952, he joined the Union of

the Peoples of Northern Angola (UPNA) and remained in
membership until 1954 when he became convinced the
organization, being interested in restoring the Kongo

91TTAngola,n .Q.P.· cit., p. 28.
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kingdom, was too narrowly oriented to be successful as a
revolutionary movement.

The UPNA, being made up of

Kikongo tribesmen, a part of the larger Bakongo group,
did not show an interest in joining with other ethnic
groups in Angola and fighting a common battle--that of
independence for all Angola.

For this reason, Roberto

founded the Union of the Peoples of Angola, as a party
pledged to bind all the peoples of Angola into the common
cause.

In spite of his supra-nationalism, he has been

accused of favoring the northern Kikongo peoples.
In September, 1958, Roberto boarded a ship at
Pointe Noire and sailed to Douala, Cameroun.

From there

he walked and hitch-hiked to Accra, Ghana, where he
attended the first All-African Peoples Conference in
December.92

His proficiency in English, French, Portuguese,

and some native languages enabled him to work as an interpreter at the conference.
States as TtJose Gilmour,

11

In 1959, he came to the United
a member of the Guinean delega-

tion to the United Nations.
Roberto, a Baptist, was educated at a Methodist
mission and attributes his revolutionary spirit to his

92John Marcum, "Angola Rebellion: Status Report,"
Africa Report, Vol. IX, No. 2 (February, 1964), p. 5.
THereinafter referred to as Marcum, S.R.)
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avowed faith in the efficacy of the Christian religion.
Roberto became a rebel

11

because a Christian who remains

silent before a crime becomes a participant in that
crime. 93
At the outset, Roberto envisioned the role

o~

the

UPA as an organization conducting sabotage and creating
general disobedience toward the Portuguese government by
the Angolan populace, but

maintain~

the insurrection only

became bloody when the Portuguese ordered a series of
11

brutal" repressions.94

This account, however, is very

likely false, since many recountines of the first day of
the insurrection are typical of the following:
The day began like almost all Angolan days in
the north, the people rose at the first light of
dawn, lit their breakfast fires, and warmed themselves against the chill of the early morning
mist. Few (natives) went to work on the coffee
plantations or hunted, but met--thousands of
them--by plan at the edge of the towns in the
valleys and (at the prescribed time) attacked.
Local Portuguese chefes de posto, plantation
foremen, merchants, and women and children were
mutilated and hacked to death; an African way of
showing contempt for the enemy. Thus began
Angola's revolt for independence.95

93Farmer, 2.E· £it., p. 105.
94 11 Revolt in A Non-Colony," Time, Vol. LXXVII,
No. 14 (March 31, 1961), p. 20.
95Lloyd Garrison, "Now Angola: Study of A
Rebel,n New York Times Magazine (February 16, 1964), p. 13.
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Roberto did, however, have instruction sheets passed out
to· rebel soldiers over his signature which required that
each unit in the.field was to select an individual to
transmit information and to receive UPA commands.

The

person chosen was not to express personal views, but
views of the whole population.

There was to be no steal-

ing by UPA soldiers and no Portuguese items seized were
to be kept.

Cooperation between the youth and the elders

was to be urged.
All money the soldiers could lay their hands on
was to be forwarded tb UPA headquarters in Leopoldville,
because "if we do not have money our work for independence
cannot continue.1196
Richard Mathews, a journalist, traveled with the
rebel troops for a period following the insurrection and
observed that 11 the UPA members were treated with warmth
and admiration 11 in the rebel-held Angolan villages and
appeared to have "won real support in northern Angola.n97
In addition, he observed that the revolt appeared to be

96 11 Rebels of Angola,n
97 Ibid . , p. 41.

QQ·

cit., p. 43.

neither anti-white nor anti-European but was, rather,
anti-Portuguese.

The thing most hated was the forced

labor system.98
Roberto attempted to set up negotiations between
his government-in-exile and the Lisbon government, but
the possibilities for negotiated settlement were slim,
especially since the official Portuguese position denied
the existence of Angolans as people separate from the
Portuguese.

Robertors conditions for settlement of the

rebellion were forwarded to the United Nations in 1963.
He demanded recognition of the right of self-determination,
the withdrawal of Portuguese troops, the freeing of
political prisoners, and general amnesty.99
The GRAE leadership has abandoned hope that
Western nations will force Portugal into a negotiated
sett~ement

through a severance of its NATO ties or through

a blockade of arms and materials.

It is this lack of

action or commitment by the Western world that has caused
Roberto to look Eastward to seek support for the revolution.

The longer the war lasts and the longer the

98rbid., p. 43.
99Marcum, S.R., 2.£· cit., p. 7.
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Western countries &re dilatory in their avowed commitment
to self-deterniinat ion, the more will be undermined the
basis for a friendly relationship with a future independent
Angola.

87

CHAPTER IV
ANGOLA AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS ·
There was genuine concern throughout the world
early in 1961 that the Angolan insurrection would become
a threat to world peace.

Few people, even governments,

are quite so concerned eight years later about the urgency
of this war.

Yet, because it is a war that has a large

region resembling a military bastion, its effect on
world peace should be ascertained.

At a time in history

when colonialism is not fashionable, and since Portugal
is determined to continue a course contrary to historical
trends, it is clear that one worldwide repercussion will
be the loss of friends by Portugal.

The newly emerged

nations are quite vehement in their condemnation of
Portugal's historical "mission," and, indeed, may become
naction-minded" with respect to their own world "mission. 11
The recent histories of the Afro-Asian and
communist bloc countries have oriented them against the
Portuguese position.

The so-called Western democracies,

while perhaps not in tune with

~he

Salazar·thesis, super-

impose this crisis on top of a much greater world problem-the Cold War.
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By request of a large number of Afro-Asian states,
the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly
have investigated, insofar as Portuguese cooperation
would permit, the situation in Angola, and have expressed
anxiety over the conflict and its effect on international
peace and security.

During the debates in the General

Assembly and the Security Council, a number of representatives stated that Portugal's policies and palliative
measures had aroused strong sentiments in their countries,
and that the continuance of the war was likely to have
international repercussions; i. e., Portugal would likely
suffer from blockades, embargoes, and a loss of friends.
The ability of the United Nations to deal directly
with the Angolan revolt was somewhat restricted, since
Portugal maintained that because Angola was an ''overseas
province" and, hence, an integral part of Portugal itself,
the struggle was an internal one.

The General Assembly,

however, could not ignore the individuals and nations who
testified that the rebellion was the consequence of genuine
grievances of the indigenous population against the administration of the territory.

These

gr~evances

included

dissatisfaction with economic conditions, specifically the
contract labor system, labor quotas, labor recruitment,
and the physical ill-treatment of laborers.

The impact of
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African nationalism, especially on the Kikongo tribe;
the rise of political groups, like the MPLA, which sought
a redress of grievances; and the severe repression to
which these groups had been subjected added to the dissatisfaction of the Angolan people.
The disturbances and conflicts have resulted in
the loss of thousands of lives, the flight of roughly
300,000 refugees from the territory, and the creation,
consequently, of a veritable atmosphere of conventional
warfare.

Because of the decadence of colonialism to most

nations of the worlq today, especially Afro-Asian, the
response was predictable and immediate.
organized.

Resistance was

Financial resources and material support were

pledged to the revolutionaries.

It was this response by

the African powers that posed a threat to world peace in
the early 1960's.

This was especially true if Angola were

to be used as a pawn' in the Cold War.
On June 1, 1961, President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana
called the Accra Conference, which was attended by over
two hundred nationalists from throughout Africa.

The

purpose of the Conference, according to the published
agenda, was to plan "a decisive assault on imperialism.nlOO

100TTFreedom Fighter's Conference in Accra, TT Africa
Report, Vol. VII, No. 7 (July, 1962), p. 13.
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Most of the meetines were secret, but the agenda indicated
that discussion would be centered upon intensification of
the struggle to gain independence for the Portuguese
colonies, the vital role and need for concerted action and
unity in the struggle, and the major problems confronting
nationalist oreanizations and parties.

At least partially

as a result of this thinking, the Organization of African
Unity became active in the Angolan rebellion.

Angola was

isolated as a target area to receive the OAU Liberation
Committee's financial and material aid.

Also, the Accra

Conference chose to recognize one revolutionary party as
the principal means of achieving self-determination, rather
than attempting to support a multi-party system representing fragmented ideas and support.
GRAE.

Hence, the OAU supported

Its multi-ethnic leadership and contact with the

people at the village level made it the liberation party
in the best position to achieve the goals of the OAU and
the Accra Conference.
The second conference of independent African
states was held in Addis Ababa in 1960, and in 1962 the
Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa
was also held in the Ethiopian capital.

The objectives

of these conferences as they relate to the Angolan
struggle were to unite the nationalist movements of these

91

areas and to promote closer association leading to federation from the Red Sea to the Cape.101

During the

Addis Ababa Conference, Premier Khrushchev pledged his
nation to the "full moral and material support" for the
struggle of the peoples of Angola.102

This

11

pledge 11

helped confirm suspicious and unofficial reports that the
Soviet Union was supplying arms for the revolution,
shipping them first to Ghana, whence they found their way
to the Congo-Kinshasa and into rebel hands.

There seems

to be little doubt that the MPLA was receiving Communist
technical and material aid through Congo-Brazzaville. 103
This aid was allegedly routed from the Soviet Union and
other communist bloc countries through Guinea and Algeria.
There is some truth to the Portuguese claim that
the revolt was partly the work of foreign agents and
agitators.

Certainly Radio Conakry in communist-leaning

Guinea beamed broadcasts into Angola and communist agents,
according to this source, were operating from Congo-

101John Hatch, A History of Postwar Africa
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1965),
p. 3 54.
102 11 African Liberation," The Mizan Newsletter,
Vol. VI, No. 5 (May, 1964), p. 60.
lOJsupra, p.

76.
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Brazzaville across the border into Congo-Kinshasa, Cabinda,
and Angola.104
The relationship of Portugal with Rhodesia and the
Republic of South Africa is not yet clear.

Portugal has

had close ties with Rhodesia since the 18$0Ts, but established firmer ties with the Republic of South Africa only
recently.

Each of these countries employs a policy of

racial discrimination that isolates it from the remainder
of the world.

This relationship can be expected to become

closer as pressure increases and common support is needed
for survival.

This position was reiterated by Mr. H. Das

Neves, mayor of Laurenco Marques, Mozambique, at a luncheon
in his honor in Pretoria, South Africa.105
The Iberian Pact also binds Portugal to Spain,
another of the remaining colonial powers in Africa.

TIIf

the going gets really tough, Franco may be counted on to
give aid, TT wrote Ramon Serrano Sun er, Foreign Minister and
brother-in-law to Generallisimo Franco.
Spain would view the taking of Portuguese colonies as an act of war and it would be the duty
of everyone to go and fight, against teB or a

104nPortugalTs Ancient Empire," Reporter, Vol. XXIV,
No. 4 (April 13, 1961), p. 22. (Hereinafter referred to as
TrEmpire.")
105 111ong Friendship Binds South Africa and Portugal,"
South African Digest, Vol. XIV, No. 14 (March 31, 1967),
p. 23.
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thousand • • . a d~ty not only to the fatherland
but to the world.106
However, since the Iberian Pact has been in effect since
1939 and Spain elected not to intervene when Portugal lost
Goa on the Indian sub-continent, perhaps the pact lacks
force and will not in the future push the world into crisis •.
The United Nations has attempted to become a vital
force in altering the course in Angola and bringing about
a peaceful settlement there; but, due to ap almost complete
lack of Portuguese cooperation or recognition that the
United Nations has a legitimate right to investigate the
Angolan crisis, little has been gained.

Numerous resolu-

tions and documents have been introduced; some have been
debated and voted upon.

In much of the deliberation, the

East-West struggle was the background issue at stake.
In April, 1961, the General Assembly adopted a
resolution which the United States supported that claimed
Portugal had not accorded Angolans adequate opportunities
for social, economic, and political advancement.

Reforms

were called for, especially the granting of self-determination to the territory.107

The United States voted in

l06t1Empire," QE• cit., p. 23.
107United Nations, General Assembly, "Declaration
Calling for the Introduction of Measures and Reforms in
Angola," A/RES/1603 (XV), Fifteenth Session (April 20,
1961).
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support of self-determination and published a bulletin
s:upporting this decj_sion against adverse Portuguese
opinion.log

United Nations Resolution A/RES/lSOe called

for a training program for territories under Portuguese
administration and declared, over Portuguese protest, that
Angola was a non-self-governing Territory, and hence,
subject to UN jurisdiction.

A/RES/1514 (XV) upheld the

right of self-determination and independence and called
for the cessation of "all armed action or repressive
measures of all kinds directed against dependent peoples.nl09
The Assembly also recognized that the denial of the rights
of peoples under colonial subjugation to self-determination
constituted a threat to the well-being of humanity and to
international peace.

Resolution A/1542 attempted to force

Portugal to comply with Resolution A/1514, but the
Portuguese position remained unaltered--Angola was an integral part of Portugal; therefore, problems there were
internal and of no concern to the United Nations.
The Assembly attempted to draw attention to the
considered judgment of the General Assembly in Resolution

lOestate Department Bulletin, Vol. XLV, No. 1170,
(November 27, 1961); unnumbered.
109United Nations, General Assembly, "Declaration
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples," A/RES/1514 (XV), Fifteenth Session, December 14,
1960.
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1514 (XV) that the process of liberation was irresistible.
Tilt is too much to hope that the nationalist sentiments
aroused in the Angolan population and the desire for
change will subside, and that the 'status quo' can be
re-established.!1110
The policy of the.United States is somewhat obscured by political reality, our dedication to selfdetermination on the one hand, and our NATO alliance with
our Western anti-communist neighbors on the other.

Foreign

observers not fruniliar with the American political system
must view our pronouncements as somewhat inconsistent.
For exrunple, after the collapse of the summit conference
in May, 1960, President Eisenhower visited President
Salazar in Lisbon and stated that the United States and
Portugal !!have worked together without a single difference
of opinion.nlll

With a change of administration in 1960,

Portueal noticed a change in our attitude toward the
African states.

Portugal believed that the United States

was in a popularity contest, seeking votes at the United
Nations.

They were also seized by the suspicion that the

Kennedy Administration was motivated by policies that

llOuN A/4978,

QI?.•

cit., P•

46.

111 ''Kingdom of Silence," 2.£· ci!!_., p. Jl.
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would win for him the support of the Negro in the United
States.

In 1961, Vice-President Johnson made a 28,500-

mile trip to explain the American cause to the world.

He

explained that
The United States must and will commit the full
strength of its great capacity, the full moral
force of our devotion to peace, the full energy
and vitality of our peoplei to the cause of
human freedom everywhere.l 2
An Angolan might reflect on democracy in the United States
and wonder about the napalm bombs being supplied to
Portugal by the United States through NATO and used in
Angola.

Perhaps the United States reasons that it cannot

show the full moral force of its devotion to the cause of
human freedom everywhere because of the politics of the
Cold War.

Africans will find this reasoning difficult

to understand.

112 11 Deeds, Not Words, 11 Nation, Vol. 192, No. 20
(May 20, 1961), p. 421.
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CHAPTER V
THE PROSPECTS OF ANGOLAN NATIONALISM
Portugal is a proud nation, proud of having been
the first country to penetrate Africa and open it to
European trade and influence.

Portugal also clings tena-

ciously to past glories, dating to the exploits and philosophies of Prince Henry.

The Portuguese are quite aware that

theirs is not only the oldest, but the last of the great
empires of the "old 11 world.
The Portuguese were not the only colonial power to
believe it had a

11

civilizing 11 mission and

11

white man's burd-

en," but they are the only power that has attempted to
transform their colonies into provinces totally integrated
sociologically with the mother country.

In addition,

Portugal has neither promised independence to its colonies
nor prepared them for it.
The government of President Salazar has made no
promises to the indigenous populations, nor has he set in
motion the machinery that will someday evolve into sovereignty for the colonies, because Portugal feels she cannot
afford to.

Portugal's economic dependence on its empire,

and especially Angola, is literally a matter of life and
death.

With its empire, Portugal is a "nation" of twenty
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million people with nearly a million square miles of area,
a balanced budget, and a highly protected market for its
exports.

Without the empire, Portugal would be a country

of barely over nine million people, with an area of thirtyfive thousand square miles, a considerable annual trade
deficit, and a depressed economy that inevitably would
lower what is already the lowest standard of living in
western Europe.
These factors, linked to the mystique of Prince
Henry's "civilizing" mission, illustrate why the world can
expect Portugal to cling to its policies with dogged
determination.

This is not to say, however, that these

policies are not irrevocable.

There are elements inside

Portugal, repressed, that are in profound disagreement
with the politics of their government.

Ex-General

Humberto Delgado and Henrique Galvao are exiled leaders
who represent strong anti-government feelings.

In 1958,

the first election where candidates were permitted to
oppose the official government slate, Delgado polled
236,528 votes while America Tomas, the government candidate, polled 758,998.113

In Angola where only 0.7% of

113Peter Fryer and Patricia M. Pinheiro, Oldest
Ally (London: Dobson Books, Lt.ct., 1961), p. 188.
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the population was eligible to vote, Delgado received
10,300 votes while Tomas received 22,300.114

The .size of

this protest vote is significant, especially since the
election was controlled.

The hijacking of the Santa

Maria by Henrique Galvao was also a violent protest
against the policies of the Portuguese government.

With

the overthrow of the government, the political policies
inside Portugal could abruptly change.

This change could

be equally abrupt for the colonies.
The role of the Western democracies probably will
not change--the primary interest in Angola's struggle will
be as it affects NATO or the Cold War balance of power.
The governments and parties of the West look upon the human
and universal aspects of democratic principles from vantage
points much too dehumanized to allow for a commitment to
the rights of the suffering Angolan citizen.

This position

by default leaves a vacuum within which communist countries
and groups can operate relatively free from competition.
The role of the United Nations will be relatively
inflexible.
nitely.

Portugal is not to remain in Africa indefi-

This inflexibility will not bring the world

114Ibid., p. 178. ·
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organization and Portugal together to resolve their
differences unless one or the other alters appreciably
its present position.

This is unlikely!

The official

United Nations position has not changed since 1960, when
General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) declared without
dissent:
. that the subjugation of peoples to alien
subjugation, domination, and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is
contrary to the United Nations Charter, and is
an impediment to the promotion of world peace
and cooperation. Immediate steps are to be
taken to transfer all powers to the peoples of
those territories without any conditions or
reservations, in accordance with their freely
expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed, or colour, in order to
enable them to enjoy complete independence and
freedom.115
Some Portuguese are hopeful that their acculturation policy can continue long enough to bring about the
lfBrazilian solution."

This "solutionlf would recognize

independence for Angola; however, Angola would assume
membership in an international Lusitanian cultural community.116

This "solution" would conflict with the funda-

mental aspects of Pan-African nationalism with which the
principal rebel organizations identify.

115uN A/1514 (XV) (December 14, 1960).
116victor C. Ferkiss, Africa's Search for Identity
(New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1966), p. 201.
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The OAU 1 s program demands an end to Portuguese
domination in Angola and self-determination and independence for its people.

Military operations are to cease,

and all acts of repression against the Angolan people
halted.

The OAU also demands an "unconditional political

amnesty 11 and free functioning political parties.117

Free

elections and a peaceful transfer of power to the elected
Angolan representatives is the ultimate goal of the OAU
program.
The OAU asks all countries to halt assistance to
Portugal which may be used to fight Angolan revolutionary
organizations and hinder the just aspirations of the
people.
Occasionally, the Portuguese press emphasizes
educational and political reforms which are to ameliorate
the wrongs of the system.

For example, citizenship has

now been granted to all Angolans.
has been abolished.

The crop quota system

The educational system has been ex-

panded to permit a more adequate education for all Angolan
children.

It should be clear, however, that rebel politi-

cal processes have matured to a point where independence

117"The OAU's 'Operation Liberation, ' 11 Africa
Report, Vol. VIII, No. 8 (August, 1963), p. 16.
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is the only permanent solution to the Portugal-Angola
problem.

Reforms can no longer bridge the gap between

the opposing forces·!
Independence for Angola is, therefore, inevitable.
The major concern, then, is the status of the new leaders
and the extent to which Angolans look to them for their
leadership.

The picture for Angola is not a happy one.

The Portuguese government has not prepared the Angolan
for independence, and the economic, political, and educational structure Angola will inherit when independence is
won will not be

staf~ed

by people adequately trained to

prevent a general condition of mayhem.
One might also address himself to the question
of Angolan nationalism.

Does it truly exist?

The

Kikongos envision a restoration of the Kongo Kingdom,
unification with the Bakongos, and severance from Angola
as an independent state.

In the south, the Cuanhamas

argue th&t independence will reinstate a political status
pre-dating Portuguese intrusion.

Most tribal groups in

Angola did not actively support the efforts of GRAE-UPA,
the MPLA, or UNITA, and tribal divisions will be a
formidable obstacle to Angolan unification.118

GRAE made

llSDr. G. Wesley Johnson, Professor of African
History, private interview held at Stanford University,
August, 1967. ·(Hereinafter referred to as G. W. Johnson.)
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the greatest inroads toward providing multi-tribal leadership; however, primary support came from the Kikongo and
Kimbundu tribes.

GRAE had difficulty overcoming the

image of fighting to reunite the Bakongo nation.

The MPLA

competed with GRAE for support from the same ethnic area.
UNITA attempted to expand its revolutionary support to the
Lunda tribes· bu·t with very limited success.

Therefore,

whatever support that GRAE, MPLA, or UNITA received came
from northern Angola.

(See Map 5.)

The effectiveness

of each organization was greatly reduced because of their
intense competition with one another.

Tribes located in

the central and southern regions of Angola never supported
the revolt and the northern tribes were fragmented "to a
point where unification after eight years ·of fighting a
'common' cause was impossible. 11 119

If this fravnented

nationalism constitutes a true assessment of the Angolan
situation, the tribes can be expected to splinter after
sovereignty is achieved.
Perhaps, with all factors weighed, Angola is not
experiencing nationalism in the countryside, but is

ll 9rv1r. Lea'O Lo:i:-enzo, Special Adviser of the
Portugal Mission to the United Nations, private interview
held at the United Nations, New York, July, 1968.

lOli.

"suffering" from elitism.

The revolutionary leadership

is made up of a Western-educated minority that may not
have communicated effectively with the masses.

Once inde-

pendence is won, the masses may fragment and rise up
against the elitist leadership.120

The extent that

elitism exists poses a danger to the success of the xevolution.

There is always this danger if leadership does

not rise organically from the people.

If the Angolan

rebel leadership is elitist, it does not detract from
their sincerity, dedication, or commitment, however.

The

sincerity of the elite is not a question; the wisdom of
the creation of an elitis.t leadership is what must be
placed in question.
The eventual control of the revolution may well
slip from the hands of the elite and terminate with
individuals not yet prominent in rebel leadership ranks.
Because MPLA leader Mario de Andrade, as a communist
sympathizer, has permitted numerous communists to infiltrate the ranks of that body, it may well become a communist
frontal organization.121

If the MPLA were to become

120G. W. Johnson
121Dr. Peter Duignan, Curator, African Section,
Hoover Library, an interview held at Stanford University
August, 1967. ·
'
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dominated by the Communist Party as Dr. Duignan suggests,
it will not have meant that the revolution at its inception was communist or even leftist.

If it should ever be,

however, it will serve notice to the Western world of its
long indifference and ignorance of this problem. ·
Portugal, too, must recognize that it must accede
to the demands of its allies, the United States and Great
Britain, that independence must be recognized as a right
and be granted to the Angolan people.122

Portugal is

clinging to an age, fading, that will soon be no more.
By attempting to perpetuate this anachronistic machine,
the world's oldest Western empire is heading toward
oblivion.

122 Anthony Verrier, ''Portugal on the Brink, 11
New Statesman, Vol. LXIV, No. 1649 (October 19, 1962),
p. 518.
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APPENDIX I
GLOSSARY OF PORTUGUESE TERMS
Assimilado

Literally, an assimilated person.
Under the Statute of 1954 this term was
used to designate an African who had
obtained the status and rights of a
full Portuguese citizen.

Caderneta (indigena)
Identity card issued to nonassimilated Africans. Commonly referred
to as "work-booklf or "native work-book."
Chef e de posto
Con to

Official in charge of a sub-area called
a posto.
Portuguese unit of currency (1 conto 1000 escudos).

Contract Labor

Africans recruited, under the supervision of local administrators, to work
on private or public projects, often
outside the region in which they normally reside, for a specified contracted
time period, with the maximum time
limit on contracts two years inside
Angola and three years outside.

Escudo

Portuguese unit of currency. The parity
of the Portuguese escudo in terms of
United States dollars is Esc. 28.75 =
$US1.

Indigena

Under the Statute of 1954, it was used
as a legal term desi,snating an individual
living in accordance with tribal ways,
i. e., non-assimilated African. Also
used in Portuguese in a more general
sense to mean African or "native."
Used in the report as an adjective to
qualify the special status of indigenous inhabitants. (Indigene - plural
form.)
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Liceu

Secondary school.

Obligatory Labor

Africans compelled to work on public
works of general and collective interest,
the results of which will benefit them,
to fulfill judicial sentences of a
penal character, and to fulfill fiscal
obligations. This means that Africans
may be requisitioned to work on public
projects whenever voluntary workers are
not sufficient, or in disaster emergencies.

Voluntary Labor

Africans who contract directly with an
employer and work in the area in which
they normally reside. The contract may
be for varying lengths of time and is
not under the direct supervision of the
provincial administrator.
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APPENDIX II
EDUCATION STATISTICS*
Government
19581955
1959

Private
19581955
1959

Total
19581955
1959

Number of schools
Primary
Secondary:
Liceu
Technical prof.
Indigenous education:
Adaptation courses
Elementary prof.
Teacher training
Other schools
Total

144

211

154

371

298

582

2
5

5
10

18
5

26
5

20
10

31
15

837
7
1

814
6
2
13

158

243

995
7
1

1,057
6
2
13

996

1,061

335

645

1,331

1,706

Number of students
Primary
11,132 16,771 7,564 13,226 18,696 29,997
Secondary
Liceu
1,510 3,006 1,610 2,355 3,120 5,361
Technical prof.
1,300 3,074
288 1,830 3,362
530
Indigenous education:
Adaptaion courses 35,938 41,866 12,310 13,913 48,248 55,779
Elementary prof.
468
426
468
426
Teacher-training
161
297
161
297
Other schools
1,007
1,007
Total
*Source:

50,509 66,447 22,014 29,762 72,523 96,229

Angola:
Reparti~ao de Estatistica Geral, Annuario
Estatistico, 1959 Luanda, 1960, p. 61.
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ON THE EXISTENCE OF THREE SEPARATE AFRICAS
I think we can and must say that there is not a single
Africa; there are several Africas. We have the Arabic
Africa, in the North, with its specific problems, its own
traditions, its peculiar culture: and it is not possible to
discover there anything fundamental, common to the other
Africas. Then we have Africa, to the South of Sahara:
the
political, sociological, and economic problems it faces are
typical, which separates them completely from those found in
other areas. Finally we have the multiracial and pluricultural Africa, and we can say with a certain amount of
pride that in it is included, with its unique characteristics,
Portuguese Africa. This theory of the three Africas does not
mean a simple speculation, neither constitutes a theoretical
interpretation with political aims. On the contrary:
it is
based on a reality that is becoming progressively more profound, it is the result of an experience that becomes clearer
day by day. Though it may look paradoxal, the political ties
created by XIX Century Europe were what gave a seeming unity
to Africa; so when those were broken or transformed, the
reality took again its rights, which are imposing themselves
with growing force.
This means it is artificial to try to
impose on the whole of Africa the same political and economic solutions, to face its sociological evolution with the
same standards, to defend a unity of action that does not
correspond to a unity of values or interests. One thing is
cooperation, which is always useful and must be established
on large bases, and another thing is uniformity, that
suffocates and kills regional values whose loss constitutes
damage to Africa itself.
If those who have some responsibility for African policy, or who have some means of influencing it, wanted to see and to accept the reality of the
three Africas and to act accordingly, we are sure that many
benefits would result from it to the continent and that the
solution of many basic problems would be found more easily.
As far as we are concerned, we have said and repeated, and
we keep saying it and repeating that we are ready to cooperate within the principles of equality and mutual respect.
And we also keep saying that from us Africa has nothing to
fear, and only extreme demagogy or obedience to interests
of others can one think and say the opposite.
(Dr. Franco Nogueira, Portuguese Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Press Conference, held in Lisbon, June 2,
1964)
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LEGISLATIVE DECREE No. 39666 ON THE STATUS OF INDIGENOUS PERSONS
OF PORTUGUESE NATIONALITY IN TH.E PROVINCES OF PORTUGUESE
GUINEA, ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQ1JE

of 20 May 1954 1
CHAPTER I.-INDIGENOFS PERS00:S OF
PORTUGUESE NATIONALITY AND THEIR
STATUS
Art. 1. In accordance with the Pulitical Constitution,2 the organic law rcbting to the Portuguese
overseas pro\•inccs 3 and the present cn::ictment, the
indigenous inhahitants of the provinces of Portuguese
Guinea, Angola and Moz~1mbique shall enjoy a special
status.

Sole paragr,lj!h. The status of an indigt.:nous person
of Portuguese nationality shall be personal and shall
be rdlcctt.:<l in wh:itcver Portuguese territory the
person possessing it m~1r be in.
Art. 2. A person shall he considered to be an
indigenous inhabitant of a province aforementioned
if he is a member of the negro race or a descrndant
of a member of that race and was born, or habitually
resides, in the province hut docs not as yet possess
the level of education or the personal and social habits
which an.· a condition for the unrestricted ::ipplic:1tion
of the public ::ind private bw pertaining to Portuguese
citizens.

Sole paragraph. A person shall likewise be considered
to be an indigenous inhabitant of the prO\·ince if he
was born of indigrnous p::irents at a place outsiJe the
province to which his p:irents had temporarily
remon·d.
Art. 3. Unless otherwise prescribed by law,
indigenous persons shall be governed by the us::igcs
and customs pertaining to their respective societies.

(1) Toleration of indigenous usages and customs
shall be subject to such limitations as ::ire imposed by
1 Text in Ditfrio do Gnvernn, Series I, No. 110, of 20 /\fay
1954, rcctivcJ through th<· L·ourtcsy of the Portuguese
Embassy, Washington, D.C. Translation by the L'nitcJ
Nations Secretariat.
1 Sec Tearboo.~ on Human Rigbtr for 1951, p. 301.
3 Sec Tearbonk o;i Jlum,111 Rigbtr for 1953, pp. 327-329.

morality, the dictates of humanity and the higher
interest of the free exercise of Portuguese sovereignty.

(2) In applying indigenous usages and customs,
the authorities shall endeavour, whenever possible,
to bring them into conformity with the fundamental
principles of public and private Portuguese law, and
shall encourage the progressive evolution of indigenous
institutions in h:irmony with those principles.
(3) The extent to which indigenous usages and
customs are to be applied shall be determined by the
stage of development reached by the indigenous
person concernc<l, his moral character and his occupational attainments and by whether he is estranged
from, or still integratc<l in, tribal society.
..-lrt. 4. The State shall endeavour by every means
to impron-, both m::iterially and morally, the living
conditions of the indigenous inhabitants, to develop
their natural aptitudes and abilities, and, in general,
to educate them by providing them with instruction
and hy transforming their primitive usages and
customs, directing their activities into useful channels
and actiYdy integrating them into the community
by gi,·ing them access to citizenship.
.'lrt. 5. The State shall providc all assistance
necessary for improving the health and increasing the
life span of the indigenous peoples and for introducing
new production techniques into the indigenous
economy.
Art. 6. The instruction especially intended for
indigenous persons shall have as its general· purpose
the moral, civic, intellectual and physical education
prescribed by law and the imparting of work habits
and work skills, :is determined by the needs of both
~l·xcs and by social and regional cconomic conditions.

(1) Tht: instruction refrrred to in this article shall
always be din:cted towards inculcating a knowledge
of the Portuguese language, but the use of the ver-
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nacubr languages may be authorizcd as a m<.:ans to
that end.

impose labour except in the cases explicitly prescribed
by law.

(2) Those indigenous persons who h:n-c received
"adaptation" tr:iining or who demonstratt~, in the
manner prescribed by law, th:1t they do not require
such training, sldl be assured of admission to public
schools under the conditions applicable to other
Portuguese n:itionals.

,drt. 33. Indigenous persons may freely choose
the work they wish to perform, whether for their
own or for another's account, on their own land or
on land allotted to them for this purpose.
"

CHAPTER IL-LEGAL STATUS OF
INDIGENOUS PERSONS
PART

I

Art. 23. Indigenous persons shall not be granted
political rights with n:spect to non-indigenous institutions.

Sole paragraph. Representatives of the indigenous
in!tabitants, chosen in the manner prescribed by law,
sh:ill sit in the lcgishtive or government councils of
each province.
Art. 24. Indigenous pcrsons sh:ill have the right
of petition and complaint, which thcy rmy exercise
at all administrative lcn~ls and in particubr with
regard to administrators of indigenous affairs and
administrative inspectors.

Sole paragraph. It shall be a disciplinary offence for
any overseas official to attempt any obstruction or
reprisal with regard to the exercise by indigenous
persons of the right confi.:rred by this article.
PART

II

Art. 25. In the absrnce of explicit kgisbti\·e
provisions concerning indigenous pc:rsons, the provisions of ordinary criminal law shall apply.

Sole paragraph. A judge, when assessing an offender's
conduct and imposing penalty, shall in every instance
take into consideration the influence exerted on thl:
s:iid offrnJer and his actions by indigcnous social
conditions.
PART

III

Sub-part I
Art. 30. Baptizl:d indigenous pl:rsons m:iy be
married'aceording to the provisions of canon bw by
a ministry of the Roman Catholic Church if thq
satisfy the requirements of the civil bw.
Art. 31. The ownership of movable property shall
be acknowledged and protected in accorJ:incc with
the general provisions of la\1·.

Sub-part II
Art. 32. The State shall endeavour to te:ich the
indigenous peoples that work is an inJispcn,ablc
clement of progress, but the authorit[e; rn:1y not

Art. 34. The performance of work for nonindigcnous pcrsorh sldl he subject to freedom of
contnct and to the right to fair pay and assistance,
and shall be supcn·ist:d by the State through competent
authorities.
Sub-part III
.drt. 35. Indigenous pt:rsons living in a tribal
organiz:ition shall be assured of the joint use and
enjoyment, in the manner prescribed by customary
law, of the land necessary for their settlement and
for the growing of their crops and the grazing of their
c:itde.

Sole paragr,1ph. Occup:1tion of land as provided in
this article docs not confer indiYidual rights of ownership and shall be go\·erned, as between indigenous
persons, by the rele\·ant usages and customs.
Art. 36. No grants of bnd may be made to nonindigenous persons unless the position of the indigenous
inhabitants established thereon h:ive been protected
as prescribed by law.
Art. 37. The State shall recognize and foster
individual rights of indigenous persons o\·er rural and
urban propcrtit·s.

Indigenous persons who have opted for ordinary
bw in the m:itter of immovable property may acquire
rights of ownership and other rights in rem over
immovable property through inheritance, legacy, gift
or purchase.
An indigenous person who has not so opted m:iy
acquire rights OYer immo\·ablc property subject to
the limitations imposcd by the following articles.

Sole paragraph. Any contract for the purchase of
immovable property in which the purchaser is an
indigenous person, ;ind any disposal by way of gift,
s::ile or otherwise of immovable property belonging
to an indig..:nous person, where such dispos::il is in
favour of :i non-indigenous person, shall be valid only
if authorized by the local judge, who shall ascertain
that the indigenous persons concerned have the
necessary legal cap:tcity anti that tht·ir interests will
not bl: injured.

CHAPTER Ilf.-TERl\IINATION OF THE
STATUS OF INDIGENOUS PERSON AND
ACQQISITION OF CITIZENSHIP
A1·t. 56. A person may relinquish the status ·of
indigenous person and acquire citizenship if he can
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prove that he satisfies all the: following requirements:

(a) Is over eighteen years of age;

(b) Speaks the Portuguese bnguage correctly;
(c) Is engaged in an occupation, trade or craft from
which he derives sufficient iw~ome to support himself
an<l the dependent members of his family, or else
possesses adequate resources for that purpose;

(tf) Is of good conduct and has attained the level.
of education and acquired the habits which arc a
condition for the unrestricted application of tht: public
and private law pertaining to Portuguese citizens;

(e) Is not on record as having refused to perform
military service or as having deserted.

(1) Evidence of compliance with the foregoing
requirements sliall be furnished in the form prescribed
by law, but in the case of items (b), (c), and (tf) a
certificate from the administrator of the municipality
or circumscription in which thc indigenous pcrson
concerned has been rcsiclent for the past three years
shall be sufficicn t.
As to evidence of good conduct, the certificate in

question must be supplemented by an extract from
tht: register of criminal oflcnces showing th:.:t the
person concerned h:is never been sentenced to imprisonment and h::is not been sentenced to detention
on more th::in two occ:isions.
(2) In c::ise of refusal by an administr::itor to grant
the relcvant certificates, an appeal may be lod17,cd
with the ::iuthorities referred to in article 58 of this
legislative decree, who shall render a fin:il decision in
the matter after ordering such investigation as they
consider appropriate.

(3) For the purposes of granting citizenship, a
notation of refusal to perform military service sh3Jl
be deemed to be without effect if military servic is
subsequently performed.
·
Art. 57. An indigenous woman married - to . a
person who acquires citizenship in pursuance of the
preceding article and any legitimate or legitimated
children under eighteen years of age living with the
father at the date when citizenship \vas acquired r11ay
also acquire citizenship if they satisfy the requirements
set out in items (b) and (d) of article 56.
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DECREE No, 18:570, July 8, 1930, Portuguese Colonial Act,
Chapter II
Article 15: The State shall guarantee the protection
and defense of the natives in the colonies, in accordance
with the principles of humanity and sovereignty, the provisions of this Chapter and the international conventions at
present in force or which may come into force.
The colonial
authorities shall prevent and penalize all abuses against
the persons and possessions of natives in accordance with
the law.
Article 16: The State shall establish public institutions and encourage the creation of private ones to
support the rights of natives or render them assistance.
The institutions in either case shall be Portuguese.
Article 17: The law shall guarantee to the natives,
under the terms stated therein, ownership and possession of
their lands and crops and this principle must be respected
in all concessions granted by the State.
Article 18: The labour of natives in the service of
the State or in that of administrative bodies shall be
remunerated.
Article 19: The following shall be prohibited:
(1) All regulations according to which the State undertakes
to furnish native labourers to any enterprises working for
their own economic development.
(2) All regulations
according to which the natives existing in any territorial
circumscription may be compelled to furnish labour to the
said enterprises under any pretext whatever.
Article 20: The State may only compel natives to
labour on public works of general benefit to the community,
in occupations the results of which will be enjoyed by them,
in execution of judicial decisions of a penal character or
for the fulfillment of fiscal obligations.
Article 21:
Regulations relating to the contracting
of native labour shall be based on the liberty of the individual and on the right to a fair wage and assistance, the
public authorities intervening only for purposes of supervision.
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Article 22: Attention shall be paid in the colonies
to the stage of evolution of the native populations, and
there shall be special statutes for natives, which, under
the authority of Portuguese public and private law, shall
lay down juridical regulations for them in keeping with their
individual, domestic, and social usages and customs, provided that these are not incompatible with morality and
dictates of humanity.
Article 23: The State shall ensure to all its overseas territories liberty of conscience and the free exercise
of the various religions, subject to the restrictions necessitated by the rights and interests of the sovereignty of
Portugal and the maintenance of public order, and so long as
they are in harmony with international treaties and conventions.
Article 24:
Religious missions overseas, being
instruments of civilization and national influence, and
establishments for the training of personnel for service in
them and in the Portuguese Padroado, shall possess a juridical character and shall be protected and assisted by the
States as institutions of learning.
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TEXT OF RESOLUTION
'I'he General Assembly,
Having considered the situation in Angola,
Recalling its resolution 1603 (XV) of 20 April 1961
and the Security Council resolution of 9 June 1961,
Having examined the report of the Sub-Committee on
the situation in Angola appointed under resolution 1603 (XV),
Deploring the lack of co-operation and assistance by
Portugal in the full and effective discharge of the SubCommi ttee' s task as called for in the aforementioned
resolutions,
Noting with deep regret Portugal's refusal to recognize Angola as a Non-Self-Governing Territory and its failure
to take measures to implement General Assembly resolution 1514
(XV) of 14 December 1960 entitled "Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples",
Convinced that the continued refusal of Portugal to
recognize the legitimate aspirations of the Angolan people
to self-determination and independence constitutes a
permanent source of international friction and threatens
international peace and security,
1. Expresses its appreciation of the work of the
Sub-Committee on the situation in Angola and commends to
the Portuguese Government, for urgent consideration and
effective implementation, the observations, findings and
conclusions set out in the Sub-Committee's report;
2. Solemnly reaffirms the inalienable right of the
Angolan people to self-determination and independence;
3. Deeply deprecates the repressive measures and
armed action against the people of Angola and the denial to
them of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and calls
upon the Portuguese authorities to desist forthwith from
repressive measures against the people of Angola;
4. Appeals to the Government of Portugal to release
immediately all Angolan political prisoners wherever they
may be held;
5. Urges the Government of Portugal to undertake,
without further delay, extensive political, economic and
social reforms and measures and in particular to set up
freely elected and representative political institutions with
a view to transfer of power to the people of Angola;
6. Decides to continue the Sub-Committee on the
situation in Angola appointed under resolution 1603 (XV):
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(a) To continue the performance of its tasks;
(b) To study ways and means to secure the implementation of the present resolution and to report thereon to
the Security Council and to the General Assembly;
7. Requests Member States to use their influence to
secure the compliance of Portugal with the present resolutions;
8. Requests all States Members of the United Nations
and members of the specialized agencies to deny to Portugal
any support and assistance which may be used by it for the
suppression of the people of Angola;
9. Requests the Government of Portugal to submit a
report to the General Assembly at its seventeenth session on
the measures it has undertaken in the implementation of the
present resolution;
10. Recommends to the Security Council, in the light
of the Council's resolution of 9 June 1961 and of the present
resolution, to keep the matter under constant review.
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DECLARATION OF THE STEERING COMMITTEE OF
UNIAO DAS POPULACOES DE ANGOLA (UPA)
~

The Union of the Populations of Angola, conscious of
its responsibility and the rights of the peoples of Angola,
declares that it is devoted in its activities to the realization and acquisition of the immediate independence of the
people, moreover to its acquisition by pacific and democratic
means.
It will spare itself no sacrifice.
In consequence:
Peasants, Unemployed, Forced Laborers, your duty is
clear. You are the most downtrodden.
It is you who suffer
most from colonial oppression. That is why you have the
greatest interest in the re-establishment of the Angolan
nation. For the past five centuries your ancestors, your
parents and you, yourselves, have been condemned to exert all
your efforts for the enrichment of only the Portuguese
colonialists. You create the riches but you have not the
right to profit from them. Your sweat is the grease of the
colonist/ your blood is sucked by the colonial vampire, and
you are left to languish in misery and humiliation.
The Union of the Populations of Angola formally
pledges to bring an end to this mortal sickness of the territory of Angola.
It calls on you all to contribute to the
liquidation of Portuguese colonialism in the national territory of Angola.
Women. The women of Ghana, Guinea, Cameroons, Togo,
Congo, and Somaliland all participated in the heroic combat
against colonialism. The hour is past when the women remained at their firesides and were mere spectators of events.
Your husbands are not paid, your children are not fed or
given schooling; they serve only as machines to permit the
colonists to live an increasingly easy life at the cost of
the misery of the peoples of Angola. You have the same rights
as the men. The Union of the Populations of Angola is determined to establish a democratic regime which will, without
distinction of sex, permit each individual to develop his
personality and contribute to the development and productivity
of the Angolan nation.
Most of the time now you are requisitioned and forced
to work on forced labor projects. The pitiless colonialist
beast requires of you the most inhuman and vile labor. The
Union of the Populations of Angola considers that this
scandal has lasted too long already, that the hour has struck
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when you should have a respectable and dignified lot in life.
Wherever you are:
organize, prepare to take up and spread
the orders of the Union of the Populations of Angola.
Erase fear and submission from your lives. You must
prove to the occupying power that you are conscious of the
justice of your cause.
Tribal Chiefs. Certainly your position is difficult.
For a long time you have unknowingly served the colonialist
interests and permitted the exploitation of the people.
Although your mission as chiefs was to protect and serve the
people of Angola. Certain members of your group have become
instruments of colonialism. They have permitted the recruitment of forced laborers and have su-ported the policy of heavy
taxation, and in a great portion of Angola their position has
made them traitors.
The Union of the Populations of Angola is not ignorant
of the terrible pressures you have suffered from colonialism,
but it knows also that at this time, when a great movement is
shaking Africa, you must not stand idly by. You must fully
realize that the moment has come for you to make your choice
between your country, your sons, your brothers on the one
hand, and the colonists on the other. That is why we ask
you to think carefully.
During the year 1960, all the African peoples are to
unite their efforts for the eviction of colonialism from
Africa. The African peoples and the people of Angola will
be pitiless for the men who have not been able to choose the
side of justice and truth. From today onward, the people
are judging you. All that you do against the people will be
held against you. This is no longer the time when a chief
could be ordered by a European and blindly strike and punish
his subjects at any moment and under any circumstances. The
end of the arbitrary has come. You must understand.
Youth. You are the seeds of Angola, it is toward you
that we all turn our hopes and our concerns.
It is to you
that we all look for new values, values which will bring
Angola's voice to be heard immediately in the concert of
nations.
You must develop your national conscience and your
human conscience. You must erase from your soul all traces
of inferiority complex. You must no longer permit yourselves
to be beaten down; you must take in your hands the destiny of
your land and of your people. And you must stand ready as the
determined reserves to come to the aid of your elder brothers
who are so enthusiastically setting in motion the battle for
national liberation.
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Portuguese Colonists. The Union of the Populations
of Angola is not the enemy of the Portuguese, but it is
against a system of spoliation which robs our land of all
existence as a nation and which condemns 4,500,000 inhabitants to illiteracy, humiliation, and famine. The Union
of the Populations of Angola is fighting with all its force
against this system.
It begs you not to stand in opposition
to the advance of history.
Certain of your members have established colossal
fortunes on the backs of the Angolans, They must be made to
understand that the hour has come when they must make restitution to the Angolans for their land and their resources,
As for the others, the Union of the Populations of
Angola tells them that they may remain in Angola in new found
peace so that together we can work for the establishment of
an Angolan Republic, democratic and socially just.
Portuguese People. You know, you are not ignorant
of the lamentatable state in which the people of Angola find
themselves. Colonists who have come from Portugal, supported
by the Army and a pitiless administration, have brought an
unbelievable reign of terror to a population of 4,500,000
people.
The Union of the Populations of Angola calls upon all
the democrats, workers, Christians, and men of good faith of
Portugal to unite their efforts to work against this disgrace to the twentieth century, which dishonors and disgraces
the name of Portugal.
Portuguese State. The regime that the Union of the
Populations of Angola will establish in Angola will be democratic.
It will be democratic because the power will be
exercised by the people for the people. It will be socially
just because it will be exercised directly and specifically
by the most needy masses. The lands will be distributed to
those who work them.
The Union of the Populations of Angola will abolish
all the special privileges and exceptions established by
your representatives. The women will also have the right of
vote.
Privileges will be abolished, eacH person shall have
an equal right to education. Unemployment will be declared
a national emergency and every force will erase this situation.
Every man and every woman inhabitant in Angola,
regardless of nationality, race, or religion, will have the
same rights as individuals, and the same rights will be
respected in relation to their belongings.
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The emancipating movement of the colonial peoples
is strongly developed.
It has acquired extraordinary power
in numbers and today is irresistible.
Men who refuse to recognize and take into consideration the prodigious wave of independence which is sweeping
the world are unrealistic and irresponsible.
The people of Africa, from Algeria to the Cape, have
come to their feet with the cry and the warning:
"Africa
for the Africans."
The Union of the Populations of Angola is certain
that you will fulfill your responsibilities. As for ourselves, we have already undertaken our own, and any resistance
to the movement is destined to be a total failure.
African Peoples. Our continent, which is in the
shape of an interrogation point, has in its heart the destiny
of all present day mankind. For so long in bondage, it is
commencing to make its voice heard in the concert of nations.
No African can remain indifferent to the existence of
colonialism on our continent. Each one of us has a definite
duty to perform: to liquidate the colonial regime, the
colonialist spirit, the colonial ideal, and to establish
democracy in Africa, to construct the United States of
Africa on the foundation of the autonomy of democratic units
which will compose it.
Taking into consideration the resolutions adopted at
the Congresses of Bandung, Cairo, Accra, Tunis, and Conakry,
and taking into account the watchwords of Liberty, Independence, and Action in Africa, the Union of the Populations of
Angola is determined to join the African Anti-Colonialist
Front and to join battle against Portuguese colonialism and
continue the fight to total victory.
It expects all the
Independent African States to aid and support its movement
unconditionally.
It expects all men, all women, to give
their full support for a free Africa as the common undertaking of the 200,000,000 souls who make up the population
of this great continent.
International Opinion. The Union of the Populations
of Angola pledges itself to spare no effort in bringing the
occupying power which controls the human and economic interests
of the Portuguese to a pacific solution.
Are not the people of Angola essentially a peace-loving
people?
In spite of repression, torture, oppression, exploitation, humiliation, in spite of slavery, the Angolan people
have always given proof of absolute pacifism, not out of
moral weakness, but because of their firm belief that be-
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tween men there is always the possibility of pacific solution
to any problem. And today it is time for the Portuguese to
respond to this call.
The Union of the Populations of Angola calls the
world to be its witness.
The solidly entrenched camp of colonialism which is
Angola today is a disgrace to all of humanity. It is the
duty of every man worthy of the name to participate in the
restoration of human dignity in Angola.
The Union of the Populations of Angola calls upon all
international organizations and bodies, for them to bring
pressure on Portugal so that the regime of exploitation and
willful genocide in Angola shall cease, and that the territory shall recover its independence of ancient days.
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MAJOR PROGRAM OF MOVIMENTO POPULAR DE
LIBERTA9AO DE ANGOLA (MPLA)
In this hour the concrete and immediate enemies of
the Angolan people are the Portuguese colonialists and their
agents, who will use all measures--violence, assassination,
Machiavellism and subterfuge, military force, political and
economic power, and cultural obscurantism--to maintain their
sovereignty in Angola and to continue to oppress and exploit
the Angolan people.
MPLA stands for the following program:
1. Immediate and Complete Independence: Liquidation
in Angola by all available means of Portuguese colonial rule
and all traces of colonialism and imperialism.
To fight in common with all the forces of Angolan
patriots in a mass popular movement, in order that the
Angolan people have the power to install in Angola a republi~
can and democratic regime on the basis of total independence.
To abolish all the privileges which the colonial
regime has conceded to the Portuguese nationals and to
foreigners.
The sovereignty of the Angolan state must belong
entirely and uniquely to the Angolan people without distinctions based on ethnic groups, class, age, political and
religious beliefs.
The Angolan nation will have the sacred and inviolable right of self-determination whether in political,
economic, diplomatic, military, and cultural planning or in
any other sphere.
Revision of the Angolan position in all treaties,
agreements, and alliances which Portugal contracted without
the free consent of the Angolan people.
A popular voluntary union with the purpose of liquidating whatever tendency of imperialistic aggression and all
the acts and works which prejudice the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Angola.
The establishment of peace in Angola, based on a
program of social justice, and the recognition by other
nations of the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Angola.
2. National Unity: To guarantee equality to all
ethnic groups in Angola and to reinforce their unity and to
help bring about friendship among them.
Absolute prohibition of all tendencies to divide the
Angolan nation.
To create conditions in Angola so that the thousands
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of Angolans who were forced to leave the country because of
cruel treatment by the colonial regime would return to
Angola.
Regions in which national minorities live in dense
numbers and possess individual characters ought to become
autonomous.
Each nationality or tribe will have the right to use
and develop its own language--written and spoken--and to
conserve or recreate its cultural heritage.
In the interest of the Angolan nation, economic and
social solidarity must be instigated and developed as well
as normal relations--in economic, social, and cultural
planning--between all the autonomous regions and all the
nationalisies or tribes in Angola.
Freedom of movement for all Angolan citizens which
does not encroach upon national boundaries.
3. African Unity: Complete solidarity with all
African peoples who are fighting for complete independence
and against colonialism and imperialism, and in particular
with the peoples and political movements which are fighting
against Portuguese colonialism.
To work for the unity of all the peoples of the
continent of Africa on the basis of respect for liberty,
dignity, and the right to develop their own political,
economic, and social systems.
Unity of all African countries based on popular will
and expressed through democratic and peaceful means.
Opposition of any move to annex or to pressure one
country over another.
In the process of uniting one or more African nations,
it resists political, economic, social conquests upon the
culture of the working class and the boundaries of each
country.
4. Democratic Regime: Republican, democratic, and
secular government for Angola.
To guarantee freedom of speech, conscience, belief,
press, assembly, associations, housing, correspondence, etc.,
for all the Angolan people.
All Angolan citizens--without distinction of nationality or tribe, of sex, social classification, cultural
background, profession, wealth, religious belief, or philosophical convictions--will have the right to vote at the age
of eighteen years and the right to be elected after twentyone years of age.
Elections will be based on universal suffrage, equal,
direct, and secret.
The Assembly of the Angolan nation will be the supreme
legislative body of the State.
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All members of the Assembly will have parliamentary
immunity,
The Assembly will designate a coalition government
which can effect a union among the various nationalities
or tribes, social classes; and among the various political
parties; and that the government will really express the
will of the nation in favor of liberty and progress; and
against political, economic, territorial, or cultural alienation to the advantage of foreigners.
The government of the republic of Angola will be the
supreme body and will exercise the executive power of the
State. It will receive its power from the Assembly and will
be responsible to that body.
Each autonomous region will have the right to adopt
methods particularly suited to its conditions, but not contradictory to the general welfare of Angola.
Africanization of all administrative machinery of the
country.
Guarantees of protection in accord with the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights to all strangers who respect the
laws in existence.
5. Economic Reconstruction and Plan of Production:
Economic development through planning stages. Transformation of Angola into a country which is modern, prosperous,
vigorous, and economically and industrially independent.
Agricultural development, with long-range planning,
principally the abandoning of a one-crop system; increase in
productivity and mechanization of agriculture.
Founding and progressive development of commercial
and industrial enterprises, of consumers, wholesale, and
producer's cooperatives. Progressive building of heavy and
light industries; the latter for the production of consumer
goods.
Exploration of the state of potential energy in the
country.
Restoration and development of traditional African
industries.
Abolition of economic privileges bestowed by the
colonial regime upon Portuguese nationals and foreign commercial houses.
Development of communication and transport facilities.
Protection of industry and private enterprise.
Encouragement of industry and of private commerce which
are useful to the progress and reinforcement of real independence of the Angolan people.
Development and vigorous activity of economic relations
between cities and villages, with the idea of progressively
improving rural conditions and the level of life of rural
populations.
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Effective implementation of a policy which considers,
at the same time, the interests of employees and employers.
Establishment of a National Bank and currency.
Avoidance of inflation and creation of a stable currency.
Control by the State for the best interest of all of
foreign trade of Angola. Revision of the unfair agreement
of Angola with Portugal. Combat the balance deficit of the
commerce of Angola. A balancing of the books--of receipts
and expenditures.
Abolition of the fiscal system introduced by Portuguese colonialists and creation of a new fiscal system; just,
rational, and simple.
Price control and prohibition of speculations.
6. Agrarian Reform: To introduce agrarian reform
that will eliminate the existing injustices ~n relation to
rural ownership; to liquidate private monopoly of special
rural production which is contrary to the denationalization
of the Angolan soil; to fulfill the principle: the land is
for those who till the soil.
Nationalization of land belonging to the enemy of
the nationalist movement after immediate and complete independence of Angola; of traitors and proven enemies of the
independent and democratic Angolan state.
Definition of the limits of private rural property,
having in mind the rural situation of each locality. After
revision of title on lands, the purchasing by the State, for
a just price, lands which are owned beyond the limits
established by law.
Distribution of land to those who do not have it and
to those who have insufficient acreage. The beneficiaries
of land legally distributed will not have to pay to the
expropriators and to the State.
Protection of the right of conquest by farmers in the
popular battle for an independent Angola.
7. Just Social Politics and of Progress: The State
ought to protect the rights of workers and farmers, and of
all social strata who have actively defended the independence of Angola; autonomy and unity of the Angolan people
and territorial integrity of the country.
Immediate abolition of the regime of forced labor.
Respect for the independence of syndicates and legal
organizations of workers.
An eight-hour day and progressive application of new
laws for the protection of workers. The State will fix a
minimum wage scale and will guard the rigorous application
of the principle, nequal salary for equal work,n without
discrimination of sex, age, and ethnic origin of workers.
Protection of churches, places and objects of worship
of legal religious institutions.
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In all planning--political, economic, social, and
will have the same rights as men. Women and
men are equal before the law.
State assistance to maternity patients and to infants.
Application of social assistance to all Angolan
citizens deprived of means and victims of disease, or in
situations of forced unemployment, or of old age or infirmity.
Solution for unemployment. Work security for
artisans, workers, functionaries, and for youths who complete
their studies.
Assistance to all citizens who are disabled because
of active participation in combat. for the independence of
Angola. Assistance to families whose members died for the
liberation of the Angolan nation.
8. Development of Instruction, Culture, and Education: Prohibition of colonial and imperialistic culture and
education. Reform of instruction in actual practice.
Development of instruction, culture, and education in the
service of liberty and of peaceful progress of the Angolan
people.
To combat vigorously and rapidly illiteracy throughout the country. Public instruction will become the obligation of the State and will be under its direction.
To progressively establish compulsory and free
primary education. To develop secondary technical-professional schools and to establish higher education.
Establishment of cultural relations with foreign
countries. Formation and perfection of technical units
necessary to the building up of the nation. To give impetus
to the study of the sciences, technology, letters, and arts.
To institute in rural areas, efficient and adequate
medical and sanitary aid for rural populations. Equal
development on a national scale of medical and sanitary
assistance.
Elimination of prostitution and alcoholism.
Stimulation and support of progressive youth activities. To support and protect, throughout the country,
physical culture.
9. National Defense: Establishment of an army for
national defense, with sufficient power, intimately linked
with the people and commanded wholly by Angolan citizens.
To arm, equip, and unqualifiedly train an army.
To install and unify new military and political instruction
for the army. To establish democratic relations between
officers and enlisted men. To consolidate discipline. Within
the army to develop and create a national conscience, and to
combat all regional tendencies.
cultural-~women
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Prohibition of foreign military bases on the national
territory.
10. Independent and Peaceful Foreign Relations:
To establish and maintain diplomatic relations with all
the countries of the world on the basis of the following
principles: mutual respect of national sovereignty and
territorial integrity; nonaggression; noninterference in
internal matters; equal and reciprocal advantages; peaceful
coexistence.
Respect for the Charter of the United Nations.
Nonalignment to whatever military bloc.
Special relations with our good neighbors and collaboration with the surrounding nations of Angola.
Protection of Angolan residents in foreign countries.
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POLITICAL GROUPS IN PORTUGUESE AFRICA
ABAKO Party
The party of the Bakongo and the X-Belguim Congo
President, Joseph Kasavubu.
Since the Bakongos live in
Angola to the North as well as the Congo, the leaders of the
Abako in Angola threaten to establish their own state if the
Portuguese persist in utilizing the tribal divisions to
obstruct the demand of independence of the Africans.
Alianca Zombo (ALIAZO)
A small tribal group around the village of Maquela
do Zombo. Also known under the title Alinaca do Naturais of
Maquela do Zoml::o and Alianca dos Originarios do Zombo.
Under the leadership of Andre Massaki, the party maintained
an independent position from the UPA and the MPLA until
April, 1962, when, after having changed the name (Democratic
Party of Angola [PDA], the party joined the UPA, which has
established a provisionary government in exile from Angola.
Alliance of the Young Angolans for Liberty
The Secretary-General, Eduardo Makumbi, in October,
1962, announced a conference (meeting) of the Young Angolans
to pressure the UPA and the MPLA to unify for the
"liberation of Angola."
Association of the Natives of the Enclave of Cabinda
Founded in 1958 with the purpose of separating
Cabinda from Angola in order to unite it to the Congo.
Confederacao das Organizacoes Nacionalistas das Colonias
Portuguesas (CONCP)
Under the leadership of the MPLA, the CONCP was
formed by the delegates of the ten parties which met at
Casablanca April 18-20, 1961. The President is Mario de
Andrade. The CONCP was established as the committee to coordinate the Portuguese territories, overseeing those who
were fighting for independence. The CONCP took the place of
the FRAIN.
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Corpos Voluntario Angolano de Assistencia dos

R~f~9i~

Organized by the MPLA in June, 1961, in order to
give medical aid to the refugees from Angola to the Congo.
Frente Africana Contra o Colonialismo Portugues (FACCP)
African Front against Portuguese Colonialism.
Established in 1962, the FACCP was the UPA's response to
the CONCP. The coalition includes the MLGV of Portuguese
Guinea and the PDA of Angola,
Frente Nacional de Libertacao de An9ola

(FN~A)

Formed in April, 1962, the FNLA is the provisionary
government and the coalition of the UPA and of the PDA or
the ALIAZO. The leader of the UPA, Holden Roberto, was
nominated Prime Minister of the provisionary government, and
Emmanuel Kounzika of the PDA was nominated Vice Prime
Minister.
In July, 1963, the Congolese Premier, Cyrille
Adoula, recognized the FNLA as the government in exile.
Frente Revolucionaria Africana para a Independencia das
Colonias Portuguesas (FRAIN)
The FRAIN replaced the coalition MAC of the MPLA
and the PAIGC.
It was formed in 1960 after the second ''All
African" meetings at Tunis and the headquarters were established at Conakry, Guinea. The FRAIN was a coalition of
four movements:
the MPLA, the PAIGC, Movement for National
Independence of Angola, and the Anti-Colony Movement. The
FRAIN was dissolved with the establishment of the CONCP in
April, 1961.
Frente Unida Angolense (FDA)
Peaceful resistance Movement organized by Socrates
Cascalos and Fernando Falcao. Composed of Whites, the
majority born in Angola, it appears that the FDA is supported
by at least two of the delegates of the National Assembly
of Angola.
In 1962, nine of the members of the FDA were
deported and imprisoned at Lisbon.
Liga Geral dos Trabalhadores de Angola

(LGT~)

Trade Union syndicate that separated from the UPA in
1962 and joined the Angolan Front of National Liberation.
The LGTA is under the leadership of Andre Cassinda, a syndicate leader from the South.
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Liga Nacional Africana (LNA)
Like the ANANGOLA, the LNA required [demanded]
several reforms. The LNA was a semi-legal organization
''assimilated" whose activities were stopped when the leaders
began to make appeal for the participation of the urban
masses.
It was a forerunner of the MPLA.
Moviment Anti-Colonista (MAC)
Nationalist movement which in 1960 joined the FRAIN
and later was absorbed by the CONCP. The MAC was formed by
the MPLA and the PAIGC of Portuguese Guinea. The aims were
"the study of the needs of the Nationalist Organizations";
the unity of action among the movements of liberation of the
Portuguese Colonies; the training of the members as reserves
for the struggle inside their countries.
Movimento de Def esa dos Interesses de Angola (MDIA)
They advocated the collaboration with Portugal after
the independence of Angola.
It was a dissident faction which
separated from the UPA in order to form the MDIA in January,
1961.
Movimento de Libertacao do Enclave de Cabinda (MLEC)
Founded in 1960 and bound to ethnic groups, it
appears that the MLEC is under the leadership of descendants
from African Families which were ennobled by the Portuguese
King and Queen; their headquarters are at Leopoldville; the
MLEC does not wish to dissolve into the Congo nor to
associate with Angola.
Movimento Popular para a

Libertac~o

de Angola (MPLA)

Under the leadership of Agostinko Neto and Mario de
Andrade, the MPLA is one of the nationalist parties of much
importance. Established in Leopoldville, it is the rival
of the UPA. Andrade, Neto, are the African intellectuals
associated with the movement.
In 1956 those men formed the
MPLA from several clandestine opposition groups. There are
several differences between the MPLA and the UPA. At first,
the mulatto leadership of the MPLA increases inter-racial
cooperation between the Whites and Blacks, whereas the Black
leadership of the UPA mistrusts the cooperation and fears
that its position is being undermined by the mulattos' better
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training. The UPA took a position favoring the Protestants,
whereas the MPLA was on the Catholic side. The brother of
Mario de Andrade is a Catholic priest who was imprisoned in
Portugal. The interior Pan-·African movement, the MPLA,
took a position for the revolutionary countries: Ghana,
Guinea, and the United Arab Republic. The UPA, on the other
hand, was tied to the Reformist nations of Nigeria, Sierra
Leone, and many of the French-speaking African countries.
Movimento Separatista Ansolana (MSA)
Founded in June, 1960, this revolutionary movement is
under the leadership of Carlos Alberto Henriques.
Movimento Separatista Lusitano (MSL)
Like the MSA, this group was founded in June, 1960,
by a white Angolese, Jose Antonio Cabral; the MSL maintains
contact with the Portuguese exiles in Brazil.
Ngwizani a Kongo (NGWIZAKO)
Founded in 1960 with the aim of restoring the old
tribal monarchy, this group advocated a possible collaboration with Portugal after the independence of Angola. The
NGWIZAKO is located at Leopoldville.
Nto-Bako Party (Partido Nto-Bako)
Protected by the Portuguese, this African party
opposes the Nationalist Activity in Angola. This party
assumes the position of spokesman for the Bakongos; its
leader is Angelion Alberto.
Partido da Luta Unida dos Africanos de Ansola (PLUA)
The first revolutionary party that sheltered a
clandestine activity in Angola.
In December, 1956, the
leader of the PLUA, Viriato da Cruz, joined the Liberation
of Angola Movement, and the Movement of National Liberation,
forming the MPLA.
Partido Comunista Angolano
Founded in 1955, was accused by the Portuguese to
have infiltrated the Nationalist, cultural, and religious
centers at Luanda, Catete, and Malanje.
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Partido Democratico de

An~ola

(PDA)

Formerly the ALIAZO, this party joined the UPA in
April, 1962, in order to form the provisionary FNLA government in Angola. The PDA leader, Errunanuel Kounzika, was made
vice-prime minister of the new government.
Uniao Nacional dos Trabalhadores

An~olanos

(UNTA)

Formed in 1954 with headquarters in Leopoldville,
the UNTA joined the CONCP.
Uniao Nacional dos Estudantes
FNLA.

Angolanao (UNEA)
'

Formed in 1962, the student movement supports the
It publishes the newspaper, Voz do Estudante An~olano.

Uniao Social dos Maimbos de Luali
Apparently this group constitutes the Cabinda section
of the ABAKO Party.
Partido Africano da Independencia da Guine e Cabo Verde
(PAIGC)
Under the leadership of Amilcar Cabral and located at
Conadry, the PAIGC was founded in 1956. Member of the FRAIN,
formed in 1960, the PAIGC later joined the CONCP. The PAIGC
maintains friendly relations with the MPLA at Leopoldville.
The original name of PAIGC is Libertacao.

Source:

Africana Newsletter, Bulletin D'Informations
Africana, Vol. 1, No. 3, Surruner, 1963, Hoover
Institution, Stanford University, Stanford,
California. Editor, Redacteur, Peter Duignan.
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